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A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE 
SHARIA PROJECT & A CROSS-
CULTURAL AND SELF-
DETERMINATION APPROACH TO 
RESOLVING THE SHARIA PROJECT IN 
NIGERIA   
I. INTRODUCTION 
he end of colonialism in numerous former colonial coun-
tries has brought rapid changes in the understanding and 
expansion of international human rights law.  African nations 
have been particularly affected by the international commu-
nity’s post-colonial attempts to implement international human 
rights law and standards into these newly formed nations’ do-
mestic legal structures.1  Nigeria is a model example of such an 
African nation.  Nigeria has persistently amended its national 
constitution, underlying domestic legal structure and interna-
tional relationships to comply with international law and to re-
spond to the international community’s allegations of interna-
tional human rights violations.2  For example, in an attempt to 
pacify the international human rights community, Nigeria has 
signed numerous human rights conventions.3  Also, following 
  
      1. Makau wa. Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal 
Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1113, 1114 (1995).   
 2. See generally Christian N. Okeke, International law in the Nigerian 
Legal System, 27 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 311 (1997).  From October 1, 1960, to date, 
Nigeria has had five or six different national constitutions and more than a 
dozen changes in leadership. Jide Ajani, All Efforts to Have a Unified Nigeria 
Have Failed, THE VANGUARD, Oct. 1, 2000, available at http://www.allAf-
rica.com (last visited Oct. 2, 2003).   
 3. Nigeria is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (signed but not yet ratified the Optional 
Protocol to the CRC as of Dec. 2002), Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”) (signed but not yet rati-
fied the Protocol to CEDAW as of Dec. 2002), the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees and Protocol, the Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 
 
T
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years of military dictatorship, Nigeria recently formed a newly 
democratic elected government.4    
Despite the post-colonial Nigerian government’s attempts to 
create a unified democratic federal government in support of 
human rights, dissidence continues to grow within its internal 
borders.5  Since the presidential election of General Olusegon 
Obasanjo in 1999, twelve states in Nigeria’s Northern region 
have questioned the validity of the Nigerian federal government 
by adopting and extending Sharia6 into their penal codes.7  The 
current political problems, associated with the adoption and 
expansion of Sharia, developed into the Sharia Project — as it 
has come to be known among legal scholars — when Zamfara 
State enacted the Sharia Courts (Administration of Justice and 
Certain Consequential Changes) Law of 1999.8  Subsequently, 
  
REPORT 2003, SELECTED INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (Dec. 31, 
2002), at http://web.amnesty.orgweb/web.nsf/3cf824eb039d237c80256d270048 
3ac2/fb462403f6b59b1180256d2e005c7d6a/$FILE/treaties.pdf.   
 4. BBC World News, Nigeria Elections Timeline (Mar. 8, 1999), at http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/280552.stm. General Olusegun Obasanjo won 
the first democratic presidential election on March 1, 1999, following 15 years 
of military rule.  Id.  
 5. A.B. Mahmoud, The Sharia Project in Northern Nigeria and Govern-
ance in a Federal Nigeria, 1 (Mar. 8–10, 2002) (unpublished paper to the con-
ference on “Globalization, State Capacity, and Self-Determination in Muslim 
Contexts,” organized by the Centre for Global International and Regional 
Studies, University of California Santa Cruz)(on file with author).  “Any as-
sumptions about the settled nature of Nigeria’s constitutional and legal order 
have now been upturned by the events of October 1999 in Zamfara State 
which triggered a wave of criminal justice reforms across the predominantly 
Muslim States of Northern Nigeria.”  Id.   
 6. Sharia, or Islamic law, is a religious set of principles based on the four 
pillars of Islam: Qu’ran (Islamic Holy text), the Sunna (teachings of the 
Prophet Mohammed), the Ulama (religious scholars) and the Qiyas (case law).  
Ismene Zarifis, Rights of Religious Minorities in Nigeria, 10 HUM. RTS. BR. 22, 
22 (2002).  
 7. M. Ozonnia Ojielo, Human Rights and Sharia’h Justice in Nigeria, 9 
ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 135, 137–38 (2003).  The twelve Northern states 
are Zamfara State, Niger State, Kano State, Katsina State, Borno State, Yobe 
State, Kebbi State, Bauchi State, Kaduna State, Sokoto State, Jigawa State 
and Gombe State. Mobolaji E. Aluko, The Unfizzled Sharia Vector in the Nige-
ria, Dawudo.com (Mar. 18, 2002), at http://Daw odu.com (last visited Sept. 2, 
2003) [hereinafter Aluko, The Unfizzled Sharia Vector].    
 8. Ojielo, supra note 7, at 137.   
Under this law, the application of Sharia’h law in Zamfara State was 
extended to cover certain Sharia’h crimes and punishments (such as 
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eleven other Northern states followed suit.9  The expansion of 
Sharia into the penal law created uproar within Nigeria and 
the international community.10  In particular, two fairly recent 
events have brought the Sharia Project to the front lines of the 
international community: the adultery case of a Nigerian Mus-
lim woman, Amina Lawal,11 and the riots caused by the Miss 
World Competition.12   In fact, the Sharia Project has become so 
devastating to the peace and unification of the Nigerian Federal 
Republic that it has been referred to as “tragic” by internation-
ally respected Nigerian author Chinua Achebe.13    
  
amputation, stoning to death and flogging) that were not included in 
the current penal code as drafted after independence.  New higher 
and upper courts were created by this law, which also expanded the 
jurisdiction of the courts to include civil as well as criminal matters.   
Id.  
 9. Id. at 138; Aluko, The Unfizzled Sharia Vector, supra note 7.   
 10. See, e.g., Mahmoud, supra note 5; Ojielo, supra note 7; Madhavi Sun-
der, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399 (April 2003); BBC World News, Ni-
geria’s stoning appeal case fails (Nov. 22, 2002), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/w 
orld/Africa/2202111.stm.  
 11. BBC World News, Nigeria woman fights stoning (July 8, 2002), at ht 
tp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/Africa/2115278.stm.  Ms. Amina Lawal is a 
woman from the Northern Nigerian State of Katsina, who conceived a child 
outside of marriage — allegedly two years after her divorce from her husband.  
She was sentenced to death by stoning for this alleged crime by the Katsina 
State Sharia Court of Appeals.  Her sentence has been overturned, and her 
case will be discussed further in Section III of this Note.  Id.   
 12. BBC World News, Muslims Condemn Nigerian Fatwa (Nov. 29, 2002), 
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Africa/2525573.stm. Disapproval and boycotting 
by Nigerian Muslims over the presence of the Miss World Competition in Ni-
geria resulted when ThisDay newspaper writer Isioma Daniel said in an arti-
cle that Prophet Mohammed may have approved of the competition and would 
have likely chosen a wife from the competitors. The comment infuriated Nige-
rian Muslims resulting in massive riots in the Northern region of Kaduna.  A 
religious fatwa for death was also ordered by a Zamfara State official against 
the writer. The Nigerian government, though, refused to allow the fatwa 
against Ms. Daniel to be carried out and called off the Miss World Competi-
tion due to the violence and controversy surrounding the event.  Id. 
 13. BBC World News, African Author attacks “tragic” Nigeria (Nov. 22, 
2002), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainament/2504023.stm. Speaking to 
the BBC, Nigerian Professor and Writer Chinua Achebe commented on the 
rise of Sharia law in Northern Nigeria: 
We have dug ourselves into Sharia; into a situation where we have 
become a laughing stock of the world, because we are discussing 
things like stoning women to death in the 21st century….Religious dif-
ferences have not just been introduced.  Muslims and others have al-
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This Note will discuss the Sharia Project in the context of the 
Nigerian Federal Republic.  It will attempt to clarify the roots of 
the Sharia Project and present some possible legal approaches 
to resolving the current international human rights problem 
resulting from the Sharia Project.  Specifically, this Note will 
attempt to answer the question, “Is there an international re-
sponse to Nigeria’s human rights violations?”   Part II of this 
Note will discuss in detail the complicated and highly conten-
tious political and social history of Nigeria.  In particular, this 
section will discuss the transformation of Nigeria from a pre-
colonial conglomerate of ethnic kingdoms and states to its cur-
rent unified Federalist form.  Finally, Part II will briefly outline 
the origins and sources of Nigerian Law — including the Nige-
rian Penal Code, the federal and state court systems, and the 
Nigerian Constitution.  Part III will discuss the Amina Lawal 
case and present a more thorough understanding of Sharia.  
This section will also describe the Sharia Project and its ori-
gins.   
Part IV will discuss the numerous constitutional and interna-
tional arguments supporting and condemning the Sharia Pro-
ject.  Specifically, this section will look at the numerous Nige-
rian constitutional provisions and international treaties rele-
vant to understanding and explaining the Sharia Project.  Part 
V will outline the numerous possible international and Islamic  
legal approaches to resolving the Sharia Project.  This Part will 
look primarily at some of the major international and Islamic 
theories behind the interpretation of international law and dis-
cuss a cross-cultural and self-determination approach to resolv-
ing the Sharia Project.  Part VI will conclude by summarizing 
and attempting to reconcile the various arguments and solu-
tions presented in this Note.    
  
ways been there, but somehow they didn’t wipe each other out…What 
is happening today is that some people are using these differences to 
promote their ambition and this is an abuse of politics…that’s why 
the selfishness of the elite stands so clearl[y].  
Id.  
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. Introduction 
The modern Nigerian State came into existence with the end 
of British colonial rule in 1960.14  The modern Nigerian legal 
system is based upon the English common law, statutory law, 
Islamic law, and customary law.15  Today, Nigeria is structured 
as a Federal Republic (Federalist model).16  The Federalism 
model resulted from the political elite’s attempts to reconcile 
the multi-ethnicity and self-determination problems that 
plagued Nigeria following the end of colonial rule and the start 
of independence.17  Initially, Federalism found widespread sup-
port among Nigeria’s diverse ethnic and religious communi-
ties.18  These communities viewed Federalism as the only viable 
option if Nigeria was to attain independence as a single unit.19  
However, the recent problems surrounding the Sharia Project 
have Nigerians questioning the Federalism model.   
In addition to the conflict surrounding the Sharia Project, the 
history of pre-colonial Niger and the post-colonial Nigerian Re-
public has been tumultuous and complicated, following the na-
tion through a multitude of geographic, political, and govern-
mental changes.20  These changes and Nigerian history are es-
sential to understanding the roots of the Sharia Project.  
  
 14. History of Nigeria, Country Reports Website, at http://www.countryre 
ports. org/history/nigehist.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2003) [hereinafter History 
of Nigeria, Country Reports Website].  Nigeria became an independent nation 
by act of the British Parliament on October 1, 1960.  Id.  
 15. CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE LAW AND POLICY, 2001 PROGRESS REPORT: 
WOMEN OF THE WORLD: LAWS AND POLICIES AFFECTING THEIR REPRODUCTIVE 
LIVES (ANGLOPHONE AFRICA) 77 (2002) [hereinafter CRLP REPORT].  
 16. Mutua, supra note 1, at 1156.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Id.  
 19. Id.  
 20. Mobalaji E. Aluko, Trouble in the Nigerian House of Othman Dan 
Bello, Aug. 28, 2002, at http://www.onlinenigeria.com/articles/ad.asp?blurb=36 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2003) [hereinafter Aluko, Trouble in the Nigerian House].  
In the forty-one years Nigeria has been independent; it has spent twenty-nine 
of those years under military rule. The last twelve years have seen major in-
ternal “fractionalization.”  Id.  
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B. Pre-British and British-Raj Eras 
1. Pre-British 
Prior to 1500, Nigeria consisted of numerous states, identified 
today by the existence of various ancient city-states and ethnic 
kingdoms.21  The period between the 16th and the 19th centu-
ries saw increasing turmoil between several ethnic factions.22  
The turning point, though, for modern Nigeria and the Islamic 
North came primarily in the 1800s.23 This period saw the expan-
sion of Islam, resulting from Usman dan Fodio’s24 holy war and 
the slow colonial conquest of Nigeria by the British Empire.25   
2. British-Raj Era 
The British gained control over the majority of present-day 
Nigeria by 1862.26  Prior to 1900, despite British influence, Ni-
  
 21. History of Nigeria, Country Reports Website, supra note 14.   Examples 
of these ancient city-states and ethnic kingdoms are the Yoruba Kingdoms, 
Ebo Kingdoms, Hausa cities, Nupe, Kanem and various cities around Lake 
Chad.  Id.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Pre-Colonial African History, Fulani Theocracy, at http://berclo.net/pa 
ge99/99en-afr-notes.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2003).  
In the 1790s a Fulani reformer, Usman dan Fodio, encouraged the 
Hausa people to revolt against their kings whom he accused of being 
little more than pagans. He led Hausa and Fulani troops in holy war 
(jihad) which swept through the Hausa States and Yorubaland to the 
South and established a Theocratic Empire based in Sokoto (north-
west Nigeria), that lasted until it was defeated by the British at the 
turn of the 20th century.   
Id. (emphasis added).  
 25. History of Nigeria, Country Reports Website, supra note 14.  
First, the Islamic holy war of Usman dan Fodio set the stage for the 
establishment of the Islamic empire in present-day Nigeria, as well 
as a large portion of East and West Africa.  Second, between 1807 
and the 1860’s the British Empire de-legalized the Atlantic slave 
trade, resulting in the empire’s greater intervention in the markets 
and government of Southern Nigeria. The empire’s intervention cou-
pled with the expansion of Usman dan Fodio’s movement helped lead 
to the colonial conquest of Nigeria in the 19th century.   
Id.  
 26. Major Nannguhan Madza, The Judicial System of Nigeria, 1987 ARMY 
L. 20, 20 (1987).  
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geria maintained a conglomerate of distinct ethnic and tribal 
states and territories that were simply overseen by the British 
Empire.27  But, on January 1, 1900, the British managed to im-
pose a complete stronghold over the various territories.28  In 
1914, the British Empire, under Sir Lord Frederick Lugard,29 
finally formed a single unit, called Niger, by uniting the north-
ern territories, southern territories and the colony of Lagos.30   
The period between 1944 and 1959 was also an intense era 
marked by political agitation and struggle for independence by 
ethnic Nigerians.31  In 1954 Nigeria became a federation of four 
regions.32   Under this federation, the government structure con-
tinued the three-tiered government model used during the early 
years of British rule.33  Also, between 1951 and 1959, the Nige-
rian government showed increased deference to, and shared 
power with, local politicians. 34 
C. Post-Colonialism 
Nigeria gained independence from Great Britain on October 
1, 1960, and formally became a republic on October 1, 1963.35   
In January 1966, the Nigerian military staged a coup and dis-
placed the civilian government.36  The military government then 
created individual states in 1967, following a failed attempt at 
  
 27. Aluko, Trouble in the Nigerian House, supra note 20.  
 28. Id.  
 29. Madza, supra note 26, at 21.  Sir Lord Frederick Lugard was the Gov-
ernor General who oversaw the formation of the Niger State under the British 
Empire.  Id.  
 30. Id.   
 31. Aluko, Trouble in the Nigerian House, supra note 20. 
 32. Madza, supra note 26, at 21.  “Nigeria became a federation in 1954. 
The country was divided into the Northern, Eastern, Western, and later, Mid-
western regiona.”  Id.  
 33. Id. at 21.  
 34. Aluko, Trouble in the Nigerian House, supra note 20.  This sharing of 
power was established through a series of Constitutions including the Rich-
ards Constitution of 1944, the MacPherson Constitution of 1951, the Lyttleton 
Constitution of 1954 and the Willinks Minority Commission report of 1957.  
Id.  
 35. Id.  Upon gaining independence, Nigeria became a Federation under a 
parliamentary system of law, a prime minister, a ceremonial governor-general 
and regional governors.  This government structure was formed under the 
Queen of England, who stood as the ceremonial Head of State.  Id. 
 36. Id.  
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creating a Westminster Model37 of government.38  The creation of 
the states was a landmark decision for the Nigerian govern-
ment as it attempted to reunite and strengthen a slowly disin-
tegrating nation, resulting from years of political instability.39   
Thirteen years of military rule ended with the adoption of the 
1979 Nigerian Federal Constitution (“1979 Constitution”) on 
October 1, 1979.40  By the time the 1979 Constitution was 
adopted, Nigeria had grown into nineteen different states.41 
Nevertheless, the initial peace and structure established by the 
1979 Constitution came to a halt with another military coup, 
this time lasting four years.42  Between 1979 and 1999 Nigeria 
went through numerous changes, including a slow increase in 
the number of states, eventually totaling thirty-six by 1999 (the 
current number), and constantly changing government heads.43  
On May 29, 1999, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo won his first 
presidential term in the nation’s first democratic elections.44  
  
 37. The Westminster Model of government is the type of parliamentary 
structure found in Great Britain, Canada and Australia.  The Westminster 
Model is considered a “responsible government”:  a political system where the 
executive government, the Cabinet and the Ministry are drawn from, and 
accountable to, the legislative branch.  The model varies from country to coun-
try.  Westminster System, Australian Politics, at http://www.australianpoli-
tics.com/democracy/terms/Westminster-system.shtml (last visited Oct. 2, 
2003).   
 38. Madza, supra note 26, at 21.  The Westminster Model failed because it 
was too homogeneous a system for such a diverse nation as Nigeria.  Id.  
 39. Id.  
 40. Id.  The 1979 Nigerian Federal Constitution was modeled after the 
United States Constitution and set up a similar legislative system with a 
Senate and a House of Representatives at the federal and state levels.  Id. 
 41. Aluko, Trouble in the Nigerian House, supra note 20.   
 42. Id.  
 43. Id.  President Shaghari (Oct. 1979–Dec. 1983) was displaced by a mili-
tary coup, following a reign by Buhari for eighteen months, who was also 
subsequently displaced by another military coup.  Babangida followed and 
stepped down in 1993. Shonoken then rose to power but was displaced again 
by a coup after only 81 days in office.  Finally, Abdusalami Abubakar followed 
Shonoken’s rule until the first democratic elections saw Chief Olusegun 
Obasanjo win the Presidency in 1999.  Id.  
 44. Chika Onyeani, Obasjano: The Wounded Presidency, AFRICAN SUN 
TIMES, Aug. 22–28, 2002, available at http://www.gamji.com/NEWS1597.htm.  
Chief Obasanjo was elected as the first civilian president of Nigeria 
in 1999, after 16 years of dictatorial military rule ending with the 
death of General Sani Abacha in 1998, and the assumption of the of-
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Obasanjo won as the result of overwhelming support from two 
of Nigeria’s main ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulanis and the 
Ibos.45  Since Obasanjo’s election, Nigeria has gone through an-
other period of great internal strife and displeasure with the 
Obasanjo government. Specifically, Nigerians who voted 
Obasanjo into office are disenchanted with his government and 
have accused him of corruption and favoritism.46  As this Note 
will discuss, the internal displeasure with Obasanjo’s govern-
ment is one of the major reasons for the secession of various 
Northern states from the 1999 Federal Nigerian Constitution 
(“1999 Constitution”) and the adoption of Sharia penal law.47   
D. The Common Law in Nigeria 
The British introduced the common law in Nigeria on Janu-
ary 1, 1900 through the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1830.  This 
Act allowed the Governor General to make laws for the colonies 
and to enact the Interpretation Act, which permitted existing 
laws in England on January 1, 1900 to apply to Nigeria.48  Prior 
  
fice of Head of State by General Abdulsalami Abubakar…Presiden[t]  
Obasanjo himself was the first military man to have handed power 
peacefully to a civilian elected president in 1979, having served as 
military Head of State from 1976-79.  
Id.   Obasanjo recently won a second term in the April 19, 2003 presidential 
elections with sixty percent of the votes.  The 2003 elections were the first 
civilian-run presidential elections since the end of military rule.   The elec-
tions results were contested heavily by opposition parties and EU observers 
cited “serious irregularities” in the voting. Nevertheless, Obasanjo is still the 
current Nigerian President.   BBC, Timeline: Nigeria (N.D.), at http://newsvot 
e.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/country_p
rofiles/1067695.stm (last visited Oct. 2, 2003).   
 45. Onyeani, supra note 44.  The Hausa-Fulani have historically controlled 
the North, the Ibo the East, and the Yoruba the West.  These three groups are 
the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria. There have been constant power 
struggles between the three groups since independence.  Mutua, supra note 1, 
at 1156.  Oddly enough, Obasanjo’s own ethnic group, the Yorubas voted 
overwhelmingly against him.  Onyeani, supra note 44.   
 46. Onyeani, supra note 44. 
 47. Aluko, Trouble in the Nigerian House, supra note 20.  “Thus it has been 
asserted that the official introduction of expanded forms of Shari[a] Islamic 
law into twelve far Northern (Muslim) States since Obasanjo’s commencement 
as president is mere ‘political Shari[a] — a reaction and counter-weight to 
Obasanjo’s government’s actions.”  Id.   
 48. Madza, supra note 26, at 21.  The Interpretation Act is also referred to 
as the Common Law Application Law. The Act allowed names, locations, 
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to independence, other English acts were enacted that applied 
directly to the Nigerian State.49   
Post-independence, due to populous uproar over the cultur-
ally divergent English laws, the regions enacted numerous acts 
that reflected the various indigenous values of the regions over 
the English laws.50  Despite these acts, some English laws re-
main in effect today.51  However, the most effective period of 
post-independence Nigerian law-reform was between 1970 and 
1979.52  It was during this period that some of the most long-
standing and essential laws were enacted.53   
E. The Penal law in Nigeria  
Currently, Nigeria has two separate criminal codes: the 
Northern Nigerian Penal Code and the Southern Nigerian 
Criminal Code.54  Although the two separate codes are similar in 
content, the Northern Penal Code reflects the Islamic values of 
the predominantly Muslim North, while the Southern Criminal 
Code reflects the colonial Christian values of the predominantly 
Christian population in the South.55  The distinction between 
the Northern and Southern criminal codes was created when 
Southern Nigeria became self-governing in 1956 and Northern 
Nigeria became self-governing in 1959.56  In particular, the pre-
dominantly Muslim North wanted to adopt a penal code that 
more closely reflected their Islamic values.57  But, the British 
did not completely accept Northern Nigeria’s self-governing 
  
counties, and office and penalties to be changed. Numerous Nigerian regions 
adopted and incorporated the Act into their local laws.  Id.  
 49. Id. at 21.  
 50. Id.  
 51. Id.  
 52. Madza, supra note 26, at 21. 
 53. Id.  For example, the National Youth Service Act of 1973, the Land 
Reform Act of 1972, the Marriage Act of 1968 and the Companies Act.  Id.  
 54. Id.  PENAL CODE (The Laws of Northern Nigeria 1963) (Nig.) Vol. III, 
ch. 89.  CRIMINAL CODE (the Laws of the Federation 1990) (Nig.) Vol. III, ch.89.   
 55. Id.  CRLP REPORT, supra note 15, at 78.  
 56. Madza, supra note 26, at 21.  Northern Nigeria was uncomfortable 
with the clashing of their customary laws with the British common law and as 
a result Northern Nigeria declared self-governing status and passed Islamic 
legislation.  Id.  
 57. Id.  
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status or their desire to adopt such a penal code.58  They felt 
that a nation-wide adoption of an Islamic penal code would 
alienate the large non-Muslim Nigerian community.59  As a re-
sult, the British enacted a separate modified penal code for the 
North, which remained in effect until the creation of the indi-
vidual states in 1967.60  Currently, each Nigerian state has its 
own penal laws but the Northern states reflect some common 
similarities with the original pre-1967 penal code, while the 
Southern states reflect some common similarities with the Brit-
ish Criminal Code.61   
F. The Nigerian Courts 
Prior to independence, the Privy Council of the British House 
of Lords heard appellate cases from the West African Court.62  
The Nigerian Federal Court system has three levels of courts.  
The highest level is the Federal Supreme Court of Nigeria.  Post 
independence, but prior to Nigeria gaining republican status, 
the Federal Supreme Court of Nigeria heard appellate cases.63  
Immediately following its change to republican status, the Fed-
eral Supreme Court of Nigeria became the Supreme Court of 
Nigeria.64  The Supreme Court has original and exclusive juris-
diction over disputes between states and between the states and 
the federal government.65  Most importantly, this Court is the 
final arbiter in determining the constitutionality of any laws or 
executive orders passed by the individual states or the federal 
government.66  The Court has a maximum of fifteen justices, 
three of whom must be learned in both Islamic law and custom-
ary law.67  The intermediate courts are the Federal High 
  
 58. Id.   
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  The Northern Penal Code differs from the Southern Criminal Code 
in numerous ways.  For example, adultery is a crime in the North punishable 
by death or lashings, while it is only a tort in the South.  Also, murder has a 
much broader definition in the Criminal Code then in the Penal Code.  Id.  
 61. Id.  
 62. Id.  
 63. Madza, supra note 26, at 23.   
 64. Id. at 23.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id.  
 67. Id.  
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Courts68 and the State High Courts are the lowest courts.69  
State High Courts have unlimited jurisdiction over all civil mat-
ters, but they do not have supervisory or appellate jurisdiction 
over Sharia Courts.70 
Separate from the federal government court system, some 
states adopted the Sharia Court of Appeals and the Customary 
Court of Appeals.71  The Sharia Court of Appeals was estab-
lished during the 1978 Constituent Assembly.72  In this compli-
cated legal structure, Islamic and customary laws are given full 
status within the recognized federal and state judiciary sys-
tems.73  The Nigerian court system also has a Federal and State 
Judiciary Commission that supports both the state and national 
court levels.74   
The Sharia Court of Appeals has created chaos within the 
Nigerian court system.  Until recently, the Sharia Court of Ap-
peals only had appellate jurisdiction over civil matters.75  On 
October 27, 1999, the Sharia Project developed into the political 
problem it is today.76  The problem began when the Northern 
state of Zamfara extended Sharia to not only encompass civil 
law matters but penal law matters as well.77  Eleven other 
Northern states followed suit.78  Sharia advocates argue that 
  
 68. Dr. Broadus N. Butler, An Afro-American Perspective: The 1979 Consti-
tution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Constitution of the United 
States of America:  A Historical and Philosophical Comparison, 1987 HOW. 
L.J. 733, 742 (1987).  In addition to the Supreme Court, the Federal court 
system consists of the Federal Court of Appeals and the Federal High Court.  
Id.  
 69. Madza, supra note 26, at 24.   
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Jibrin Ibrahim, Democracy and Minority Rights in Nigeria: Religion, 
Shariah, and the 1999 Constitution, 8 (Mar. 7–10, 2002) (unpublished draft 
paper for the Conference on “Globalization, State Capacity, and Self-
Determination in Muslim Contexts,” organized by the Center for Global, In-
ternational, and Regional Studies, University of California–Santa  Cruz, 
Santa Cruz) (on file with author).    
 73. Butler, supra note 68, at 742.  
 74. Id.  The purpose of the Commission is to advise on matters relating to 
judicial qualifications and judicial conduct.  Id.  
 75. Ibrahim, supra note 72, at 8–9.  
 76. Id. at 9. 
 77. Id.  
 78. See supra note 7 for a list of Northern Nigerian States that have 
adopted Sharia thus far.   
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the Sharia Project is permissible because the 1999 Constitution 
left the establishment of Sharia courts and customary courts 
open to the desire of the states.79  Currently, there is no legal 
theory under Nigerian national law or international human 
rights law for overturning a religious court’s holding, except by 
the prescribed court methods.80  
G. The Nigerian Constitution  
The Nigerian Constitution has an extensive history of insta-
bility and evolution. Nigeria has had nine different constitu-
tions since the inception of the first Nigerian Constitution in 
1922.81  The most recent version of the Nigerian Constitution 
was created in 1999.82  The 1999 Constitution, which is based on 
the 1979 Constitution,83 came into existence shortly after the 
election of President Obasanjo’s first term on May 29, 1999.84   
The 1979 Constitution is of great social85 and political impor-
tance to the modern structure of the Nigerian Republic because 
it was the first time a new presidential style Federal Constitu-
tion was adopted by the Nigerian Republic.86   The 1999 version 
went even further than the 1979 Constitution by expanding the 
federal powers of Nigeria through the addition of five major sec-
tions:  Separation of Powers, Federalism, Bill of Rights, Party 
  
 79. NIG. CONST. (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999) §§ 
275–77.   Sharia advocates’ constitutional arguments will be discussed later in 
Part IV.A of this Note.   
 80. Sunder, supra note 10, at 1405.   
 81. Radio interview with Philip Emeagwali, Discussion of the 1995 Draft 
Constitution for Nigeria, at the Grand Hyatt Hotel in Washington D.C. (Dec. 
5, 1998).  Nigeria has had nine different Constitutions: 1922, 1946, 1951, 
1954, 1960, 1963, 1979, 1989 and 1999.  Id.  
 82. NIG. CONST. (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999).  
 83. Butler, supra note 68, at 733.  The 1979 Nigerian Constitution, adopted 
on October 1, 1979, is considered by some scholars to be the most definitive 
statement of the goals of democratic nationhood, national unity in human 
diversity, and commitment to Civil and Human Rights since the United States 
Constitution and Declaration of Independence.  Id.  
 84. Nigeria Index, Institut für öffentliches Recht-Aktuell, at http://www.oe 
fre.unibe.ch/law/icl/ni__indx.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2003).    
 85. Butler, supra note 68, at 745. “Nigeria pursues the unification of the 
nation (through the 1979 Constitution) by making all types of racial, ethnic, 
religious, sexual, or regional discrimination unconstitutional.”  Id.   
 86. Nigeria Index, Institut für öffentliches Recht-Aktuell, supra note 84.   
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System, and Secularism.87  The addition of these five sections 
has created dissent in Nigeria and uproar in the Sharia Project.   
III. THE AMINA LAWAL CASE, SHARIA, AND THE SHARIA PROJECT  
A. Amina Lawal Case 
The Amina Lawal case created a huge controversy in the in-
ternational human rights community.  The case represents the 
types of human rights violations that the expansion of Sharia in 
Northern Nigeria can generate, and the types of violations the 
Nigerian federal government wishes to deter.  Ms. Lawal is a 
woman from the Northern state of Katsina.88  A local Sharia 
court sentenced Amina to death by stoning for allegedly com-
mitting adultery.89  The official charges read to the accused by 
the Bakori Sharia court read, “Amina admitted that she had 
committed adultery with Yahaya, which had resulted in the 
birth of the baby.”90  Yahaya denied the adultery accusation and 
stated that there were no witnesses to prove he had committed 
adultery.91  Instead, he accused Ms. Lawal of making a false ac-
cusation.92  The court then simply asked Yahaya to swear on the 
Qu’ran that he was not guilty, which he did, and then the court 
passed a guilty judgment on Ms. Lawal and discharged Ya-
haya.93  The court passed a guilty judgment on Ms. Lawal based 
on the following evidence:  
Her confession of Zina is implied through the birth of a child 
out of wedlock, the evidence of the baby presented by the 
  
 87. Yemi Akinseye-George, Correspondent’s Report in Nigeria, JURIST, May 
29, 1999, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/world/nigeriacor1.htm.  
 88. Katsina is one of the Northern states that has extended the scope of 
Sharia.  See supra note 7.   
 89. Legal Memorandum from Aliyu Musa Yauri & Hauwa Ibrahim, The 
Case of Ms. Lawal Lawal Kurami: Sentenced to Death by Stoning for Adultery 
(reporting on the decision of The Sharia Court in Bakori to the Upper Sharia 
Court in Funtua, Katsina State) (on file with author) [hereinafter Legal 
Memo].  Ms. Lawal was sentenced on March 22, 2002 by the Sharia court in 
Bakori.  Id.      
 90. Id.  Yahaya was the man accused of committing adultery with Ms. 
Lawal. Yahaya only admitted that he had been courting Ms. Lawal for mar-
riage.  Id.     
 91. Id.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  The court passed a guilty judgment on February 20, 2002.  Id.  
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prosecution, the charge against her which is contrary to the 
Suratul Bani Ismaila Verse 32 of the Holy Qu’ran where Allah 
(SWT) said, “And come not near unto adultery.  Lo! It is an 
abomination and an evil way.”94     
On March 22, 2002, the judge sentenced Ms. Lawal to death 
by stoning — based upon passages from the book Al-Risala, the 
Hadith of Arba’una, and Section 125(b) of the Katsina State 
Laws.95  The judge then stated that Ms. Lawal would be sched-
uled for execution after she had weaned her child.96  Following 
an appeal by Ms. Lawal, the Sharia Appellate Court of Funtua 
affirmed the lower court’s decision on August 19, 2002.97  The 
case was then appealed to the Katsina State Sharia Court of 
Appeals.98   
In the interim, the Nigerian government received intense 
pressure from various international human rights organizations 
and foreign governments.99  Both Italy and Brazil had even of-
fered asylum to Ms. Lawal.100  Despite the international pres-
sure, Nigerian Justice Minister Kanu Agabi declared that Nige-
rian law did not allow the federal government to interfere with 
  
 94. Id.  Zina is unlawful sexual intercourse.  See infra n.117.   
 95. Id.   
[T]he book Al-Risala reads: “Whoever being of complete faculties 
commits the offence of zina should be stoned until he/she dies.” Fur-
thermore, he cited the Hadith of Arba-una which was narrated by Ibn 
Masud on page 70 verse 14 where the Prophet is said to have said: 
“The blood of a Muslim can only shed validly in 3 circumstances: 1) a 
married person, male or female, (or who was once married) who 
commits adulter[y].”  
Id.  A hadith is the narration about the life of the Prophet and about the be-
haviors and practices he approved.  Sunna and Hadith, USC Website, at 
http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah (last visited Oct. 2, 
2003).   
 96. Id.  
 97. Press Release, Save Ms. Lawal Lawal and Oppose the Practice of 
Death by Stoning, Amnesty USA (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.amnes 
tyusa.org/actioncenter/actions/Ms.Lawallawal.pdf.  
 98. Id.  
 99. Somini Sengupta, Facing Death for Adultery, Nigerian Woman Is Ac-
quitted, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2003, at A3.  
 100. Id.  
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the Islamic court’s ruling, unless an appeal reached the Federal 
Supreme Court in Abuja.101   
Following a great amount of international pressure and nu-
merous appeals, the Katsina State Sharia Court of Appeals fi-
nally overturned the lower court’s conviction of Ms. Lawal in a 
four to one decision on September 25, 2003.102  The ruling was a 
relief for both Ms. Lawal and the Nigerian government.  The 
ruling relieved President Obasanjo from having to overrule a 
negative decision by the Sharia court on constitutional grounds, 
which would have further antagonized the Muslim North.103   
The court overturned the lower court’s decision largely based 
on procedural and substantive irregularities, finding that: 104  (1) 
the lower court had been wrong in not allowing Ms. Lawal’s re-
traction of her earlier confession of guilt; (2) Ms. Lawal’s first 
confession of guilt was invalid because it was uttered only once, 
instead of four times as required by Islamic law; (3) the first 
trial was invalid because only one judge presided over the case 
instead of the requisite three; (4) the police who arrested Ms. 
Lawal produced no witnesses to the fornication; and (5) the 
court found validity in defense counsel’s “sleeping embryo 
theor[y].”105  Arguably, from a human rights perspective, the 
grounds for her final not guilty judgment were as questionable 
as the grounds for her initial conviction, albeit the final result 
was more just.  Despite the positive outcome of Ms. Lawal’s 
Case, Sharia still exists as means of criminal enforcement in 
Northern Nigeria, and the Sharia Project is far from resolved.   
  
 101. BBC World News, Nigeria Vows to Prevent Stoning (Nov. 8, 2002), at 
http://news.bbc.co/uk/2/hi/Africa/2430603.stm.  
 102. Sengupta, supra note 99, at A3. 
 103. Id.   
 104. Id.  
 105. Id.  The sleeping embryo theory is a theory which states that under 
certain interpretations of Sharia, an embryo can be in gestation for up to five 
years, which means that Amina’s baby could have been fathered by Amina’s 
former husband.  Id.   
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B. Sharia and the Sharia Project in Nigeria 
1. Sharia 
“Islam rightly means submission to the will of God.”106  Sharia 
is the law of Islam.107  Since 1978, Sharia has been a major actor 
in the struggle for civil and political rights in Nigeria.108  Nigeri-
ans are predominately of the Sunni tradition of Islam, and 
practice a specific school of Islamic law known as the Maliki 
school of thought.109  The Maliki School of Islamic jurisprudence 
  
 106. Ojielo, supra note 7, at 143.  
 107. Zarifis, supra note 6, at 22; Hamid M. Khan, Nothing Is Written: Fun-
damentalism, Revivalism, Reformism and the Fate of Islamic Law, 24 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 273, 279 (2002) [hereinafter Khan, Nothing Is Written].   
 108. Ibrahim, supra note 72, at 8.   
 109. See Ojielo, supra note 7, at 132.   
The Sunni tradition, which today comprises approximately 85-90 per-
cent of all Muslims, differs from Shia tradition, which comprises the 
remainder of the Muslim world. The distinction between the two tra-
ditions essentially derives from different approaches to governance. 
The Sunni believe, based on specific provisions of the Qu’ran and the 
Sunna, that the Muslim people are to be governed by consensus 
(ijma’) through an elected Head of State, the khalifa, according to 
democratic principles. The Shia, however, believe that the leader of 
Islam, whom they refer to as the imam rather than the khalifa, must 
be a descendant of the Prophet. The concept is the basis for a heredi-
tary hierarchy in the Shia tradition.  
The School of Thought in Islam, Middle East Institute, at http://www.mid 
easti.org/library/islam/schools.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2003).  
The Maliki school of thought was founded by Abd Allah Malik ibn 
Anas (ca. 715-95), a leading jurist from Medina. Malik ibn Anas is 
said to have particularly regarded as important the old pre-form of 
legal school of Medina as the "city of the prophet" and the legal dis-
course of the local jurists. The Maliki school which emerged as a 
countercurrent to the Hanifite school spread mainly to North Africa 
— Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco — Spain and to several areas in 
West Africa as well as Central Africa. Today, the Maliki school may 
also be found in Upper Egypt, Mauritania, Nigeria, West Africa, Ku-
wait and Bahrain. Apart from the four sources of jurisprudence as es-
tablished by ash-Shafii, the Maliki school of law additionally rec-
ogni[z]es legal decisions based on judgments more conducive to the 
public interes[t].  
Islamic Jurisprudence and its Sources, Immer noch sterben Menschen Steini- 
gung, at http://www.steinigung.org/artikel/islamic_jurisprudence.htm#I5b (la-
st visited Oct. 2, 2003).  
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provides that a person is presumed guilty until proven inno-
cent.110 
Sharia is a set of religious principles based upon four sacred 
Islamic pillars of law and practice: “Qu’ran (Islamic holy text), 
the Sunna (teachings of the Prophet Mohammed, the Ulama 
(religious scholars), and the Qiyas (case law).”111  It is a guide by 
which Muslims and Muslim societies resolve disputes, and by 
which they can live their lives according to the word of Allah.112  
It prescribes guidelines and rules for most every-day activities, 
from marriage to prayers to dress to crime.113  Sharia does not 
distinguish between “the religious and the secular, between the 
legal, ethical, and moral questions or between the public and 
private aspects of a Muslim’s life.”114  This lack of distinction is 
the crux of the problem surrounding the Sharia Project.  
Sharia penal law provides a detailed set of principles, crimes, 
and penalties for offenders.115  For example, under Article 150 of 
Zamfara State’s Sharia penal code, alcohol consumption man-
dates caning and imprisonment, and Article 127 mandates one 
hundred lashes for adultery if unmarried and imprisonment or 
death by stoning if married.116  Specifically, Sharia penal law 
falls under three separate categories of offenses and punish-
ments: (1) Hudud (Qu’ranic offenses and punishments);117 (2) 
the law of homicide and hurt;118 and (3) Ta’zir, Siyasa119 (other 
  
 110. Ojielo, supra note 7, at 143.  
 111. Zarifis, supra note 6, at 22.   
 112. Id.  
 113. Khan, Nothing Is Written, supra note 107, at 277.   
 114. Id. at 277. 
 115. Zarifis, supra note 6, at 22. 
 116. Id.  
 117. DR. RUUD PETERS, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE REINTRODUCTION OF 
ISLAMIC PENAL LAW IN NORTHERN NIGERIA 8 (Sept. 2001) (A Study Conducted 
on Behalf of the European Commission with the assistance of Maarten Bar-
ends, Lagos) (on file with author).  The Qu’ranic offenses are crimes men-
tioned in the Qu’ran.  Under Sharia, these offenses have fixed penalties, re-
ferred to as the Hudud collectively, or Hadd punishment, singularly.  Id.  The 
Qu’ranic offenses include unlawful sexual intercourse or zina, theft or sariqa, 
robbery or hiraba, drinking of alcohol or shrub al-khamr, and false accusation 
of unlawful sexual intercourse or qadf.  Id.   
 118. Id.  These offenses are only punishable if the victim or his “avengers” 
demand that the offender is punished.  Under these offenses, if homicide or 
hurt is done intentionally, then the punishment is equal retaliation—“an eye 
for an eye.”  If it is an unintentional crime or if the victims or heirs are willing 
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crimes that are punishable at the judge’s discretion).120  The 
Qu’ranic offenses have garnered the most attention from the 
international community, particularly the offense of unlawful 
sexual intercourse (zina), theft (sariqa), robbery (hiraba), drink-
ing of alcohol (shrub al-khamr), and false accusation of unlaw-
ful sexual intercourse (qadf).121  As stated earlier, the punish-
ment for zina, the crime at issue in the Ms. Lawal Lawal case, 
is stoning to death for persons who are or have ever contracted 
a valid marriage.122  For persons “who have never contracted a 
valid marriage, the punishment is one hundred lashes, and in 
addition, banishment for men.”123      
2. The Sharia Project 
a. Background 
The rise and expansion of Sharia in many Islamic countries 
and communities is considered by scholars to be a method of 
regaining Muslim cultural identity.124  The Sharia Project, in 
Nigeria, is considered by many scholars to be the Muslim 
North’s attempt at regaining its cultural identity; however, 
some Christians believe that the Sharia Project is political, not 
a spiritual or religious movement, and aims to marginalize 
  
to forgo the punishment, then the punishment is the payment of a diya or 
blood price.  Id.   
 119. Id.  These offenses are deemed sinful or undesirable by Islamic crimi-
nal code and the offenses and punishments are usually left to the discretion of 
the judge and possibly legislators.  Id.   
 120. Id.  
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id.  
 124. Khan, Nothing Is Written, supra note 107, at 299.   
For the vast majority of Muslims, the resurgence of Islam [i]s a re-
surgence of cultural identity, formal religious observance, family val-
ues, and morality.  The establishment of an Islamic society is seen as 
requiring a personal and social transformation that is a prerequisite 
for true Islamic government.  Effective change is to come from below 
through a gradual social transformation brought about by implemen-
tation of Islamic law. 
Id.  
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Christians.125  Other reasons and arguments supporting and 
denouncing the Sharia Project are discussed later in this sec-
tion.   
The same issues surrounding the Sharia Project today were 
also the root of the most contentious debate during the 1978 
Constituent Assembly.126  One of the primary contentions among 
various members of Nigeria’s Christian and Muslim communi-
ties covered during the debate concerned the proposed estab-
lishment of a Sharia Court of Appeal.127  The final compromise 
between the two groups resulted in the creation of a Sharia 
Court of Appeal with limited jurisdiction to civil law.128  How-
ever, the Sharia Project has created tension between Christians 
and Muslims groups again.129  There has been continuous oppo-
sition by Christians since Zamfara State first adopted Sharia 
law.130  For example, on February 21, 2000, in Kaduna State, a 
Christian anti-Sharia demonstration led to a major battle be-
tween Christians and pro-Sharia Muslims resulting in “massive 
killings of people on both sides, the destruction of religious 
buildings, general arson and the destruction of property.”131  The 
“Kaduna Conflict” led to widespread insecurity among Chris-
tian minority groups in the affected states and resulted in 
  
 125. See generally Ojielo, supra note 7; Zarifis, supra note 6.  See also BBC 
World News, Fifth Nigerian State Extends Sharia Law (Jan. 14, 2000), at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/Africa/603681.stm.  
 126. Ibrahim, supra note 72, at 8.   
 127. Id. Christians viewed the establishment of the Sharia Court of Appeals 
as the first step toward the establishment of an Islamic State, while Muslims 
argued that the establishment of the Court was a natural extension of the 
establishment of the lower Sharia Courts, of which Muslims had been de-
manding the creation for a long time.  Id.  
 128. Id. at 8–9. 
 129. Id. at 9.  
 130. BBC World News, Fifth Nigerian State Extends Sharia Law, supra 
note 125. 
 131. Ibrahim, supra note 72, at 9.  
The scale of massacres and destruction was very high and thousands 
of people were reported to have been slaughtered like rams.  People 
were said to have organized the killing of their neighbors simply be-
cause they belonged to a different religious order.  This phenomenon 
led to a major religious re-structuring of the town with people con-
gregating in areas where their religious faith had a majority of in-
habitants.   
Id.  
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members of both religious groups calling for the partition of Ni-
geria.132   
The Sharia Project culminated with the gathering of the Na-
tional Council of State on February 29, 2000.133  The National 
Council directed that the Sharia laws enacted by the Northern 
states be retracted and that their legal systems return to the 
status quo ante.134  This decision was not met with much support 
and riots between Christians and Muslims resumed in increas-
ing numbers in the Northern states.135  Finally, in April 2000, a 
committee of various Northern governors met to resolve the 
continuing riots and the Sharia Project.136  The committee an-
nounced: “We have resolved to uphold the whole North as one 
indivisible entity within the Federation of Nigeria.”137   
b. North vs. South: The Rise of the Sharia Project   
The Sharia Project did not arise out of a vacuum.  There ex-
ists a long history of struggle for Muslim self-identity within 
post-colonial Nigeria and the Nigerian political structure.  Ben 
Nwabeuze,138 a professor of constitutional law and member of 
the 1978–79 Constituent Assembly, has argued that the Sharia 
Project is not just a debate over law, but a debate over the very 
nature of Nigeria.139  Defining what exactly the “very nature” of 
  
 132. Id.  The state of Kaduna continued to experience religious riots result-
ing from the Sharia Project. Two other riots, in June 2001 and in November 
2002, resulted in massive violence and destruction in Kaduna.  Major dis-
placement as religious violence broke out in Kaduna State (February 2000; 
July 2001 and November 2002), Global IDP Database, at http://www.db.idppr 
oject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/wViewCountries/BFA28324C3E0CA8FC1256B10
003CB2B4 (last visited Oct. 2, 2003).  
 133. Ibrahim, supra note 72, at 9–10. The National Council of State is a 
federal organization composed of the Head of State, former Heads of State, 
and State Governors.  Id.  
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. at 10 (“Two members of the Council and former Heads of State, 
Shehu Shagari and Mohammadu Buhari, denied that such a decision had 
been taken and contended that Muslims were not ready to compromise on the 
Sharia.”).  
 136. Id.  The Governors set up a joint Muslim–Christian Committee in 
hopes of aligning the Sharia law with the Penal Code and in hopes of counter-
ing threats to the unity of the North and Nigeria as a whole.  Id. 
 137. Id.   
 138. Ibrahim, supra note 72, at 10.   
 139. Id.   
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Nigeria means has, in fact, helped bolster the Sharia Project. 
The various arguments defining and explaining the Sharia Pro-
ject and the “very nature” of Nigeria are described below.     
For example, the reintroduction of Sharia penal law is justi-
fied by Muslims on religious grounds.140  Muslims believe that in 
order to be a good Muslim, one must live one’s life according to 
Islamic law, which supposes that religion, law, and the rituals 
of daily life are inseparably intertwined.141  In addition, many 
Muslims welcome the extension of Sharia as a way to eliminate 
a wide range of social crimes and corruption, which are believed 
to be a product of globalization.142  In response to globalization’s 
effect on religion, as in the context of the Sharia Project, one 
  
The distinction between civil and penal law has an important bearing 
on the issue of state enforcement. In civil law, the state, through its 
judicial arm, the courts, merely imposes its machinery as an impar-
tial disinterested arbiter between parties in a dispute; it lacks the 
power to initiate the process of adjudication, and must wait until it is 
moved by one of the disputants. So the enforcement through the 
courts of the civil aspects of Sharia does not involve the support, 
promotion or sponsorship by the State of the Moslem religion in pref-
erence to other religions….In criminal law however, the position is 
entirely different. The state invokes its coercive power to arrest and 
detain an alleged offender, to initiate a criminal charge against him 
in court, and to see to the effective prosecution of the charge. Thus, as 
complainant, initiator of the criminal process and prosecutor, the 
state is an interested party. Accordingly, the enforcement by the state 
of the Sharia penal law under the Qu’ran involves the use of its ma-
chinery to aid, support and sponsor the Islamic religion in preference 
to other religions. (Quoted from The Post Express, April 13th, 2001).   
Id. 
 140. PETERS, supra note 117, at 15.  
 141. Id.  
 142. See id.  See also Ibrahim, supra note 72, at 4–5.    
The Sharia under this paradigm the [Sharia Project] becomes a form 
of Northern resistance — not to Southern Nigeria, but to the forces of 
globalization and to their westernizing consequences. Even the policy 
of the privatization of public enterprises is probably an aspect of the 
new globalizing ideology. Privatization in Nigeria may either lead to 
new transnational corporations establishing their roots or to private 
Southern entrepreneurs outsmarting Northerners and deepening the 
economic divide between the North and the South (quote[d] [in] the 
Weekly Trust, May 18th, 2001).   
Ibrahim, supra note 72, at 18–19.   
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Nigerian scholar states, “[r]eligion today is a product of moder-
nity as well as a response to it.”143  
Second, corruption has been an open wound for Nigeria.  Ni-
geria is considered one of the most corrupt countries in the 
world.144  For example, former military dictator Sani Abacha 
allegedly stole approximately five billion dollars from the Nige-
rian treasury.145  The public has been, and continues to be, insis-
tent on finding answers to such allegations, as for corruption.146  
As a result, some Nigerians believe that former leaders such as 
Abacha are attempting to divert the public’s attention from 
their own past crimes by attempting to destabilize Nigeria 
through the Sharia Project, instead of providing truthful an-
swers.147   
Third, political disaffection and a history of political monop-
oly by the North are also considered root causes of the expan-
sion of Sharia.148  Since 1960, eight of the twelve heads of the 
Nigerian federal government originated from the North.149  
These eight Northern heads governed Nigeria through thirty-
six of the forty-one years of its independence.150  Furthermore, 
seven of these twelve heads of State have been Muslims, cover-
ing thirty-one of the forty-one years.151  But, the current federal 
government is headed by a southerner, Obasanjo, and many 
Nigerians believe that the North’s unhappiness with his presi-
dency has resulted in the North’s attempt to regain power in 
Nigeria via the Sharia Project.152  This history of the Muslim 
North’s political monopoly though underlies the South’s and 
  
 143. Id. at 5. 
 144. Radio interview with Philip Emeagwali, Sharia Crisis in Nigeria (Mar. 
16, 2000), available at http://emeagwali.com/interviews/Sharia/crisis-in-nigeri 
a.html; see also Transparency International, World Corruption Perception 
Index, available at http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2003/2 
003.10.05.cpi2003_launch_announcement.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2003).  
 145. Id.  
 146. Id.  
 147. Id.  
 148. Aluko, Trouble in the Nigerian House, supra note 20.   
 149. Id.  
 150. Id.  
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. The current President is a Southerner and a Christian.  See infra 
Part II.C. 
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non-Muslims’ apprehension and revolt over the Sharia Pro-
ject.153  
Specifically, the alleged “power shift” in 1999 is offered as 
support for the North’s adoption of Sharia.154  As a result of the 
North’s political monopoly, the people of Southern Nigeria 
called for the federal seat of power to shift from the North to the 
South in 1999.155  By chance, the realization of the Southern 
people’s call for power coincided with the democratic presiden-
tial elections of May 1999.156  In order to ease the growing politi-
cal tensions between the North and the South, the political ma-
jority in the North created a “political pact” to not contest the 
presidency so that a Southerner could become president.157   
However, the attempts to ease tensions were unsuccessful. 
The conservative southern Yoruba political elite felt that 
Obasanjo did not reflect the political ideals of the South, and 
that he was merely the North’s puppet.158  Yoruba skepticism of 
  
 153. Id.    
 154. Ibrahim, supra note 72, at 19.  The term “power shift” was coined first 
by the Southwestern Press in Nigeria.  Id.  
As Alex Ekwueme, former Vice-President during the Second Republic 
has argued (Guardian 26/1/99), the term was invented as an alterna-
tive to the concepts of zoning and rotation which had dominated the 
National Constitutional Conference of 1994-95. Section 229 of the 
1995 Draft Constitution had stipulated that the Presidency should be 
rotated between the North and the South, Gubernatorial power ro-
tated between the three Senatorial districts in each state and the 
Chairmanship of local governments between three zones to be created 
in each of them. These constitutional proposals were, however, com-
pletely discredited when it became clear that General Abacha had no 
intention of vacating power. He was planning and plotting to con-
tinue as “elected President.”  Since he was from the Muslim North, 
the implication was that the zoning was therefore going to start from 
the North, the region that had monopolized power for a long time. 
The concept of power shift arose, therefore, to remove the ambiguity 
associated with zoning and rotation. The idea was to focus on what 
was presented as the essential issue of a Southerner taking over 
power.  
Id.  
 155. Id.   
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. at 20.  The pact allocated the presidency to the Yoruba of the 
southwest, who presented two candidates, of which Obasanjo was the winner.  
Id.   
 158. Ibrahim, supra note 72, at 20. 
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Obasanjo’s power ultimately led to the creation of a Yoruba mi-
litia group called the Odua Peoples Congress (“OPC”).159  The 
OPC increased attacks on ethnic minority groups in 
Yorubaland, including Hausa Muslim settlers.160 
Obasanjo, through his “modernization policies,” infuriated the 
South and exacerbated the conflict by frustrating the North’s 
political agendas.161  The policies included the elimination of 
various political posts, which had been held predominantly by 
Northern Muslims.162 As a result, these “modernization policies” 
were seen as an “elimination policy” and attack on the Muslim 
North.163  In addition to Obasanjo’s “modernization policies,” his 
own overt, conservative Christian beliefs have made the more 
radical Muslims groups in Nigeria suspicious of his political 
actions, seeing them as policies intended to eliminate the Is-
lamic stronghold in Nigeria.164  As a result, some Sharia oppo-
nents have argued that the North’s adoption and expansion of 
Sharia is merely “political Sharia”— a reaction and “counter-
weight” to Obasanjo’s modernization policies.165  
Fourth, religious sectarianism is also considered an impor-
tant factor fostering the Sharia Project.  The population of Ni-
geria is approximately one hundred twelve million; a little more 
than fifty percent of this population is Muslim and located in 
Northern Nigeria.166  The majority of this Muslim population 
adheres to the Sunni tradition, rather then the Shiite tradi-
tion.167   Nevertheless, over the past few years, a “radical set of 
  
 159. Id.  
 160. Id.  
 161. Id.  
 162. Id.  
 163. Id.  
 164. Ibrahim, supra note 72, at 20–23; Aluko, Trouble in the Nigerian 
House, supra note 20. 
 165. Aluko, Trouble in the Nigerian House, supra note 20.  
 166. See id.; see also CRLP REPORT, supra note 15, at 75.   
 167. Mahmoud, supra note 5, at 10–12.  The Sunni and Shi’a (Shiite) dis-
tinction of Islam arose after the death of the Prophet Mohammed.  The Shiites 
declared Ali, Mohammed’s son-in-law, the successor of Mohammed, while 
Mohammed’s wife Aisha appointed another caliph to head the Sunni sect.  
Shi’ism began as a political movement and its adherents believed that an 
Imam, or religious leader, cannot be chosen by the community as Aisha chose 
for the Sunni.  Instead, the Imam would rise to power by virtue of his inher-
ited dignity and righteousness.  Alison E. Graves, Women in Iran: Obstacles to 
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fundamentalist movements” (Shiite movements) and groups 
have developed in Nigeria.168  These fundamentalist groups are 
pushing aggressively for the Islamicization of the North because 
they are impatient with the allegedly corrupt status quo of 
Northern state power.169  Thus, the Sharia Project also can be 
viewed as the result of sectarian competition between the Sunni 
and the Shiite traditions.  
Fifth, the Sharia Project’s success has also been attributed to 
the North’s socio-economic disenfranchisement from the eco-
nomic and developmental benefits afforded to the South.170  The 
unemployment rate in Nigeria is approximately twenty percent, 
a number that is considered dramatically understated.171  Un-
employment and underemployment has created an environment 
for socio-economic disenfranchisement in Nigeria, and particu-
larly in the North.172  One socio-economic factor underlying  
Northern socio-economic disenfranchisement has been educa-
tion.  For many Muslims, there is a noticeable disparity be-
tween the qualities of education offered in the North versus the 
South.173  The South’s educational systems are predominantly 
based in the Western tradition whereas the North’s are based in 
the Qu’ranic tradition.174  Many Nigerians believe that a West-
ern education does not guarantee employment, but without 
Western education, employment is unlikely — thus those edu-
cated under the Qu’ranic tradition consider themselves at a 
disadvantage.175   In addition to the disparity in education, the 
uneven distribution of wealth between the wealthy oil produc-
ing Southern states and the poorer Northern states has created 
  
Human Rights and Possible Solutions, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER & LAW 57, 61–62 
(1996).    
 168. See Mahmoud, supra note 5, at 10–12.  Two groups that have pushed 
for the Islamization of the North include Yan Izalah and Maitatsine.  The Yan 
Izalah, in particular, along with other groups such as the Council of Ulama, 
are championing the campaign to fully Islamicize the Nigerian North.  Aluko, 
Trouble in the Nigerian House, supra note 20; Mahmoud, supra note 5, at 10–
12. 
 169. Id.  
 170. Id.  
 171. Aluko, Trouble in the Nigerian House, supra note 20. 
 172. Id.  
 173. Id.  
 174. Id.  
 175. Id.  
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further socio-economic disenfranchisement — particularly be-
cause Northern states believe that the Southern states are us-
ing their monopoly of the oil industry to control the Nigerian 
Republic and the Muslim population.176  All of these issues are 
considered to be relevant reasons underlying the Sharia Pro-
ject’s success.   
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ARGUMENTS  
A. Constitutional Arguments  
1. Introduction 
The major provisions of the Constitution at issue are Section 
38,177 Section 10,178 Section 4 and Sections 275–77.179  Section 38 
guarantees freedom of religion, Section 10 prohibits a state re-
ligion, and Sections 4 and 277 allow the states to establish 
Sharia courts and expand the jurisdiction of the Sharia Court 
  
 176. Femi Awoniyi, Bala Usman, G.G. Darah, and the Concept of Nation in 
Nigerian Politics, Rejoinder to a speech entitled “Ignorance, Knowledge and 
Democratic Politics in Nigeria,” (April 17, 2001) (on file with author).    
 177. NIG. CONST. (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999) §38.  
Section 38 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution reads:  
(1) Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion, including freedom to change his religion or belief, and 
freedom (either alone or in community with others, and in public or 
in private) to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, 
teaching, practice and observance.  
(2) No person attending any place of education shall be required to 
receive religious instruction or to take part in or attend any religious 
ceremony or observance if such instruction, ceremony or observance 
relates to a religion other than his own, or religion not approved by 
his parent or guardian.  
(3) No religious community or denomination shall be prevented from 
providing religious instruction for pupils of that community or de-
nomination in any place of education maintained wholly by that 
community or denomination.  
(4) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person to form, take part 
in the activity or be a member of a secret society.  
Id.  
 178. Id.  Section 10 states: “The Government of the Federation or of a State 
shall not adopt any religion as state religion.”  Id.    
 179. Mahmoud, supra note 5, at 13.  
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of Appeals.180   The interpretation of these sections is greatly 
contested in the Sharia Project.   
2. Sections 10, 38, and 275–77: Sharia  
and State Religion 
Section 10 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution reads: “The 
Government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any 
religion as state religion.”181  This is understood to mean that 
neither the legislative nor executive powers of the Federation or 
the States may “aid, advance, foster, promote or sponsor a relig-
ion.”182  Sharia advocates though counter that Section 10 does 
not mean secularism, as the term is never actually used any-
where in the Constitution.183  Furthermore, advocates argue 
that Sharia has always been, and continues to be, an integral 
part of the Northern legal system, since pre-independence, and 
as a result, the adoption of Sharia does not amount to a state 
religion, and further Sharia applies only to Muslims, not non-
Muslims.184  Advocates further point to Section 38 of the 1999 
Constitution, which expressly advocates freedom of religion (al-
lowing Muslims the right to practice their religion, which 
means living according to the law of Sharia), and Sections 275–
77, which empower the states to establish Sharia Courts.185   
In particular, advocates argue that Sections 275–77 expressly 
allow the creation of Sharia courts, including a Sharia Court of 
Appeals, which gives the court jurisdiction over personal (civil) 
matters, and declare that the jurisdiction is “in addition to such 
other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by the law of the 
state.”186  So how can an express constitutional allowance for 
Sharia Court jurisdictional expansion make the extension 
,adoption, and adjudication of Sharia penal law be a violation of 
the Constitution?    
  
 180. NIG. CONST. (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999) §§ 
4, 10, 38 and 277. 
 181. Id. at § 10.  
 182. PETERS, supra note 117, at 32. 
 183. Ibrahim, supra note 72, at 12–13. 
 184. PETERS, supra note 117, at 32. 
 185. See id; see also NIG. CONST. (Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 1999) §§ 275–77. 
 186. NIG. CONST. (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999) §§ 
275–77.  
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Sharia opponents argue that adopting and enforcing any reli-
gious penal law amounts to adopting a state religion, which is 
forbidden by Section 10 of the Constitution.187  Specifically, op-
ponents argue that recognition of Muslim personal (civil) law is 
sufficient for Muslims to live according to Islam, and as a result 
the elimination of Sharia penal law is not a violation of Mus-
lim’s freedom of religion, particularly since the Muslim North 
has lived without Sharia penal law for a significant period of 
time prior to 1999.188  Opponents further argue that since exten-
sion of Sharia into the penal law would require an intensive 
involvement of the State, it is in fact an adoption of a state re-
ligion within the context of the Constitution.189  While the State 
acts as a “disinterested arbiter” between parties in civil dis-
putes, the State invokes its “coercive powers” in criminal mat-
ters; as a result, state expansion and enforcement of Sharia 
prejudices other religions in favor of Islam and requires the 
State to integrate and enforce religious law outside the confines 
of a secular state.190  Opponents also see the extension of Sharia 
into the penal law as creating a slippery slope, in that, once one 
state is permitted to extend Sharia, other states will follow.191  
The slippery slope argument holds some power, exemplified by 
the fact that, to date, eleven states have followed Zamfara in 
adopting and extending Sharia, ultimately resulting in the slow 
dissolution of the 1999 Constitution.  As a result, some scholars 
argue that opposition to the extension of Sharia is vital to hin-
dering the rapid Islamicization of the Nigeria and subsequent 
deviation from the arguably secular Constitution.192   
3. Section 4: State Legislative Powers 
Section 4 of the 1999 Constitution is also of importance in 
understanding the Sharia Project.  Section 4 divides the legisla-
tive powers of Nigeria between the Federation and the states.193  
This allocation of powers is described in detail in the 1999 Con-
  
 187. PETERS, supra note 117, at 32; Mahmoud, supra note 5, at 13. 
 188. PETERS, supra note 117, at 32. 
 189. Id.   
 190. Ibrahim, supra note 72, at 11. 
 191. See generally Ibrahim, supra note 72; Mahmoud, supra note 5; PETERS, 
supra note 117.  
 192. Mahmoud, supra note 5, at 20.  
 193. PETERS, supra note 117, at 32.  
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stitution’s appended Executive Legislative List and the Concur-
rent Legislative List.194  The Executive Legislative List details 
sixty-eight subjects that fall within federal legislative power, 
while the Concurrent Legislative List details subjects that fall 
under both the federal and state legislative powers.195  Matters 
that do not fall under either list are left to the states’ legislative 
powers.196  Neither list mentions penal law, prompting advocates 
to argue that the states have the legislative power to adopt or 
extend Sharia penal law.197  
Opponents counter that while the penal law in general is not 
detailed in the Legislative List, the Executive Legislative List 
does discuss and detail the subjects of evidence, police, and 
prisons as federal matters, therefore, the states may not ad-
dress these topics.198  If the laws of evidence, police, and prisons 
are federal subjects, how can states justifiably and fairly try 
criminal cases or impose criminal sanctions?  They cannot, be-
cause the Sharia Penal Codes, as the Hadd offenses, not only 
contain numerous evidentiary provisions,199 but they also exhibit 
the numerous inconsistencies and differences that exist be-
tween the Islamic law of evidence and the current common law 
Evidence Act.200  Dr. Ruud Peters, professor at the University of 
Amsterdam, describes this dilemma perfectly:  
Since the hadd offen[s]es in particular are subject to strict 
rules of proof, the constitutional position regarding evidence is 
an obstacle to the strict application of these rules, for the fed-
  
 194. Id. at 32.  
 195. Id.  
 196. Id.  
 197. Id.  
 198. Id.  
 199. Id.  
 200. For example, one of the major differences between the two sets of evi-
dence laws concerns the unequal treatment of men versus women regarding 
the rules of evidence.  The Islamic law standards are biased against women. 
Under zina, in order to exonerate herself from a charge of adultery, a woman 
is required to present four male Muslim witnesses to the rape. Therefore, if a 
woman cannot find four adult pious males to accuse the perpetrator, the 
woman is accused of adultery and can be punished by stoning. Whereas, the 
common law Evidence Act advocates equal evidentiary standards for both men 
and women.  Mahmoud, supra note 5 at 18; PETERS, supra note 117, at 20–21; 
Rape and Incest as Penal Code Offenses,  Sisters in Islam Website — Justice, 
Equality, Democracy and Diversity, Nov. 30, 2000, at http://www.muslimten 
ts.com/sistersinislam/PressStatements/30112000_a.htm.   
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eral law of evidence admits more forms of legal proof in crimi-
nal matters than only confession and the testimony of two (for 
unlawful intercourse, four) adult Muslim males of good moral 
reputation. Application of the federal rules would make the 
application of corporal punishment for these offen[s]es much 
easier.201  
Thus, the essence of the Sharia penal code is frustrated.  
Finally, advocates argue that the Constitution does not direct 
the states to enact legislation based upon specific sources be-
yond the agreement of the people and members, through a de-
mocratic process, and as represented by the state legislature.202  
Thus, the Northern states argue that the imposition and exten-
sion of Sharia has been by the support of the people in accor-
dance with a democratic process, and with the support of their 
state legislatures.203  But, in reality, it is known that no state 
governors engaged in any dialogue or held consultations with 
their citizens concerning the desirability of the adoption or ex-
tension of Sharia.204   
4. Due Process and Equal Protection Issues 
Equal protection is another integral problem with the Sharia 
Project.  The application of two concurrent penal codes, the 
Sharia Penal Code and the Federal Penal Code, go to the heart 
of equal protection of the law.  Specifically, this situation 
overtly counters the equal protection of the law advocated by 
the Constitution.205   This basically means that citizens of the 
same territory face different punishments for the same crimes.  
For example, in the case of the Hudud, Muslims are subjected 
to extreme criminal punishments, such as stoning to death, for 
the same crimes for which non-Muslims are barely punished.206  
This disparity has created insecurity and opposition in the non-
Muslim population and resentment in the Muslim population.207  
  
 201. PETERS, supra note 117, at 34.  
 202. Mahmoud, supra note 5, at 14. 
 203. Ojielo, supra note 7, at 158.  
 204. Id.  
 205. Mahmoud, supra note 5, at 15.   
 206. Id.  
 207. Grand hypocrisy of Sharia application and the politics of religious 
power play, NIGERIA TODAY ONLINE (Aug. 23, 2002), at http://waado.org/Ni 
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In addition, as discussed earlier, the Maliki School of Jurispru-
dence, practiced in the North, dictates that an individual is 
guilty until proven innocent.208  This standard directly counters 
the due process required under Article 36 of the 1999 Constitu-
tion which states, “[e]very person who is charged with a crimi-
nal offense shall be presumed to be innocent until he is proven 
guilty.”209  Furthermore, under state and federal legislation, 
courts can not enforce customary laws that are “repugnant to 
natural justice, equity and good conscience,” “incompatible ei-
ther directly or by implication with any law…in force,” or “con-
trary to public policy.”210  These statutory, legislative and policy 
factors bolster the argument that the Sharia Project is in con-
tradiction to the notion of equal protection and due process.  
The specifics of the reasons underlying this notion are discussed 
more in detail below.  
Many Northern states, such as Zamfara and Kano, have at-
tempted to alleviate non-Muslim concerns.211  The various 
Northern governments have stated that the code does not apply 
to non-Muslims and therefore will not be enforced against non-
Muslims.212  But this also means that non-Muslims have no legal 
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the code in the 
Sharia courts, thus limiting their voice in the matter.213  Oppo-
nents also argue that, although non-Muslims are not prosecuted 
in Sharia courts, they still have to live in the Sharia States 
where their “public life, culture, and social ethos” are greatly 
affected by the Sharia laws, particularly when dealing with en-
forcement issues, and where their civil, political, and constitu-
tional rights are hindered greatly as a result.214  
  
gerDelta/HumanRights/Sharia/NigeriaOnline-23Aug2.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 
2003).  
 208. Ojielo, supra note 7, at 143. 
 209. NIG. CONST. (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999) §36. 
 210. CRLP REPORT, supra note 15, at 77, citing Kaniye S.A. Ebeku, The 
Legal Status of Nigerian Children Born by a Widow: Chinweze v. Masi Revis-
ited, 38 J. AFR. L. 46, 57 (1994).   
 211. Mahmoud, supra note 5, at 15. 
 212. Id.  
 213. Id.  
 214. Id.  For example, Sharia outlaws the sale of alcohol, gambling, and 
other such practices, which other religions do not outlaw.  Therefore, non-
Muslims living in the Sharia States would not be able to purchase alcohol if 
they desired to do so.  Similar problems exist with police enforcement.  Often 
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Adequate police and judicial enforcement also create equal 
protection problem and due process problems.215  A.B. Mah-
moud, a Nigerian scholar, argues that it “appears problematic 
and almost an illusion for states to assume the possibility of far 
reaching reforms of their criminal justice systems under the 
present federal structure in which they neither have autono-
mous judicial institutions nor independent mechanisms for the 
enforcement of their own laws.” 216  Specifically, Mahmoud as-
serts that the judicial systems are organized so that eventually 
the state courts merge into the Federal Appellate Court system, 
making every decision of the lowest court reviewable by the 
highest court in the country. 217  In reality this means that 
Sharia court holdings do not garner much weight since they can 
be overturned by the Federal Appellate Court, so the impact 
and purpose of the Sharia Project itself is diminished.  
Similar problems with police enforcement and the prison sys-
tem exist in the application of the Sharia Project.218  Nigeria 
currently has one national police force and one prison system.219  
The federal authorities control both the police and prison sys-
tems.220  Furthermore, the police and prison employees come 
from a variety of religious, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds.221  
As a result, the extreme diversity of the police and prison em-
ployees make it difficult to implement uniform enforcement of 
laws, because “the difficulties in enforcing unfamiliar laws in 
respect of which they receive no particular training and have no 
particular sympathies, even discounting outright hostility, are 
clearly enormous.”222   A greater concern, though, is the ability of 
  
the police are not prudent or discriminatory in their actions.  Specifically, 
there have been numerous incidents where non-Muslims have been subjected 
to Sharia punishments because the police in the Sharia States have not both-
ered to determine the identity of the alleged offender.   Id.  
 215. Id. at 14.  
 216. Id.  
 217. Mahmoud, supra note 5, at 14.  
 218. Id.  
 219. Id.  
 220. Id.  
 221. Id.  
 222. Id.   For example, there have been numerous incidents of non-Muslim 
offenders being subjected to Sharia punishments because the police have 
failed to recognize the persons as non-Muslims, or have even failed to inquire 
into these people’s identities.  Id.  
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the Nigerian government to accommodate and enforce such “dif-
ferent notions of crime and punishment,” particularly punish-
ments which are seen by the international community as de-
grading and apparent human rights violations.223    
Another enforcement problem is the wide discretion used by 
the police in choosing a proper venue for prosecution.  The po-
lice are the first in the chain of prosecution, and the local police 
are known to choose the venue for prosecution arbitrarily and in 
a biased manner.224  For example, the police will often favor 
Muslim offenders by arraigning them before non-Muslim courts 
for offences that would have garnered harsher punishments in 
the Sharia courts.225  As a result, there is unequal protection of 
offenders even within the Muslim community.  The Muslim aid 
groups or Hisbah also create equal protection enforcement prob-
lems in the North.226  Hisbah’s arbitrary use of  prosecutorial 
power is problematic to fair notions of equal protection and due 
process.  Specifically, the Hisbah are allowed to prosecute based 
upon their notion of what constitutes a violation of Sharia 
moral norms, but not on what “is” a Sharia violation — which 
can lead to arbitrary and capricious detention and persecution 
of innocent individuals.227  Most dangerous is the fact that the 
Hisbah often do not discriminate between Muslims and Non-
Muslims.228  These are such grave Sharia Project problems that 
even some advocates of Sharia reform appreciate these Consti-
tutional and legal inconsistencies. 229   
  
 223. Mahmoud, supra note 5, at 15.  
 224. Id.  
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. The Sharia governments created the Hisbah to aid in the arrest 
and enforcement of the Sharia Penal Codes.  Id.   
 227. Id.  
 228. Mahmoud, supra note 5, at 15. 
 229. Id. at 16–17 (emphasis added).   
[U]nder the current arrangement…the overwhelming legislative and 
executive authority of the Federal Government has confined the 
states to narrow limits…Sharia which relies on state legislation, is 
constitutionally excluded from many areas of societal life especially in 
the area of economic policy, secondly the exclusive legislative power 
of the federation over some vital areas…like the law of evidence 
means that even where the Sharia applies as the substantive law, it 
may be subjected to adjectival rules that prevent realizing its poten-
tial. Dr Tabiue also draws attention to the fact that Sharia courts 
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The current dual legal system in the North has resulted in 
the abuse of the criminal justice system, the fostering of Islamic 
fundamentalism, and has assisted in furthering the disintegra-
tion of Nigerian national unity.  Until these issues are resolved, 
the Sharia Project will continue to create an array of equal pro-
tection and due process problems. 
B. International law 
1. Relevant International Law 
One of the major arguments in opposition to Sharia has been 
that numerous Sharia laws violate international human rights 
law. 230  Nigeria is a Member State of the United Nations.231  As a 
Member State, Article 1, Section 3 of the United Nations Char-
ter requires Member States to act together to promote and en-
courage “respect for human rights and for fundamental free-
doms.”232  Nigeria is also a party to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (“ACHPR”), the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Conven-
tion against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”), and the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(“CEDAW”).233  The Sharia Project and Sharia criminal sanc-
tions sit in direct contravention to the human rights standards 
set forth in these treaties.  
  
which operate only at state level, lack independent power to interpret 
and apply Islamic laws. All their decisions are subject to appeal to 
federal courts where English legal concepts, legal methods, and legal 
procedures dominate. He further poses the question how far can “its 
(federal government) police force be relied upon to enforce Sharia 
laws…a police force (that is) manned by people of various faiths and 
background[s].” 
Id.  
 230. Such as the biased treatment of women and the alleged cruelty of the 
Hudud punishments as stoning.  
 231. Nigeria became a member on October 7, 1960.  List of Member States, 
UN Website, available at http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2003).  
 232. U.N. CHARTER art.1, para. 3. 
 233. Zarifis, supra note 6, at 23. 
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In addition, Article 14 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (“VCLT”) states that once a state (nation) has be-
come a party to these international treaties, the state (nation) 
has the obligation to carry out its international obligations and 
can not invoke its domestic law as justification for non-
compliance with the treaty.234  Under the VCLT, the Federal 
Nigerian government has the ultimate responsibility of ensur-
ing that the principles set forth in these treaties are carried out 
in good-faith to their fullest potential.235 Thus, it can be argued 
that, the Nigerian federal government’s failure to control and 
restrict the Sharia Project is a violation of the VCLT and 
international law; particularly since state-imposed Sharia may 
“not be invoked as a reason for non-implementation of Nigeria’s 
international human rights obligations.”236   
Furthermore, Nigeria is also obligated to abide by these in-
ternational treaties domestically.  Nigeria frequently uses the 
method of incorporation to implement international treaties 
domestically.237  Nigeria incorporates and enforces the treaty 
provisions domestically through an act of Parliament en banc.238  
As a result, all fundamental rights supported by the human 
rights treaties that were signed or acceded to by Nigeria are 
applicable throughout Nigeria.239  For example, Nigeria has 
signed, ratified, and incorporated into domestic law the 
ACHPR.240  Therefore Nigerian courts can invoke its provisions 
in interpreting relevant domestic legislation.241   
The international community has also argued that the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) is international 
customary law, and as a result sets human rights standards for 
all states including Nigeria.242  Thus, under Article 5 of the 
  
 234. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 14, May 23, 1980, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331.  
 235. Zarifis, supra note 6, at 23. 
 236. Id.  
 237. Okeke, supra note 2, at 342.  
 238. Id.  
 239. Id.  
 240. Id.   
 241. Id.  
 242. See PETERS, supra note 117, at 35.  See also Christian Boulanger, Is-
lamic Law and International Human Rights — The Case of Corporal Punish-
ment in Iran, available at http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~boulang/texte/iran2.ht 
ml (last visited Oct. 2, 2003). 
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UDHR, which prohibits torture and cruel and inhuman treat-
ment, the imposition of Sharia punishments, such as stoning 
and amputation, violate the UDHR.243  However, most African 
and Asian countries argue that the UDHR does not fairly repre-
sent these countries and their belief systems because most Afri-
can and Asian countries did not participate in the formulation 
of the UDHR, as they were still under colonial rule during this 
time.244  
Lastly, Sharia infringes upon numerous legal rights and reli-
gious practices accorded to religious minorities.245  For example, 
Article 27 of the ICCPR “protects religious minorities from be-
ing denied the right to practice their religions ‘in community 
with the other members of their group.’”246  For example, the 
disparate standards surrounding the rules of evidence, rights of 
appeal, and legal representation applied to Muslims as opposed 
to non-Muslims, discussed in Part IV.A, inherently discriminate 
against non-Muslims and infringe upon the right of non-
Muslims to freely practice their religion.247  Sharia not only vio-
lates the rights of non-Muslim minorities but also precludes 
Muslim opponents of the Sharia Project, whose opposition iso-
lates them from the majority Sharia supporters, from being 
heard by a constitutionally mandated court, if desired.248  As a 
result, they are forced to practice Islam according to the rules of 
the Muslim State, and denied the civil and political rights pro-
vided by the secular federal government and international hu-
man rights standards and treaties.    
Sharia also violates Article 6 of the ICCPR, which protects 
the right to life.249  The Hadd punishment of stoning to death, 
such as in zina cases, is a clear violation of this article.250  The 
UN Human Rights Commission has interpreted the ICCPR to 
permit the death penalty “only for intentional offenses that 
  
 243. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 5, G.A. Res. 217A(III), 
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); see also Boulanger, supra note 
242 (arguing that Sharia punishments are cruel and inhumane).   
 244. Boulanger, supra note 242.   
 245. Zarifis, supra note 6, at 23.  
 246. Id.   
 247. Id.  
 248. Id.  
 249. Id.  
 250. Id.  
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cause lethal or extremely grave consequences, stating that 
‘when the death penalty is applied by a state party for the most 
serious crimes…it must be carried out in such a way as to cause 
the least possible physical and mental suffering.’”251   The pun-
ishment of stoning to death clearly violates both of these princi-
ples when imposed to punish adultery.  First, adultery does not 
fall under “most serious crime,” and second execution by stoning 
is not a method that causes “the least possible physical and 
mental suffering.”252   Furthermore, the Hadd punishments of 
stoning, flogging, and amputation for offenses of theft, alcohol 
consumption, robbery, adultery, and rape violate Article 7 of the 
ICCPR, which prohibits torture or cruel, inhumane or degrad-
ing punishment.253  CAT further supports this assertion.254  In 
addition to these international human rights treaties, Article 34 
of the 1999 Constitution also states that no person shall be sub-
jected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishments.255 
Although Nigeria is a signatory to these various human 
rights treaties and has enacted numerous equal protection do-
mestic policies, discrimination, specifically directed against 
women, persists — resulting from the extension of Sharia.  One 
such discriminatory tactic was seen shortly after Zamfara State 
adopted Sharia law, when officials released a directive ordering 
all single and divorced women to get married or lose their 
jobs.256  This directive was adopted despite the enactment of the 
2000 National Policy on Women in Nigeria257 and is clearly con-
trary to Article 11 of CEDAW, which requires countries to pro-
tect womens’ right to work, ensure that women have equal  
training and employment opportunities, receive equal pay for 
  
 251. Zarifis, supra note 6, at 23.   
 252. Id. at 24.  
 253. Id.; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7, opened 
for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.  
 254. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 
85. 
 255. NIG. CONST. (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999) § 
34.  
 256. CRLP REPORT, supra note 15, at 84.   
 257. Id.  The Policy on Women proscribes that all  “labour laws shall be 
renewed to include more and better protective measures for women work-
ers…which include ensuring employers provide paid maternity to working 
mothers, whether single or married.”  Id.  
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work of equal value and have access to the same benefits, com-
pensatory schemes and allowances, especially in relation to re-
tirement and incapacity to work, as men.258  In addition to 
CEDAW, Article 42 of the 1999 Constitution embodies the prin-
ciple that all persons are equal under the law.259  Thus, certain 
provisions of the Sharia Penal Codes, such as the requirements 
for proof of zina, violate both Article 42 and CEDAW.260  
Sharia and the Sharia Project have been and continue to be a 
constant point of controversy in the international community.  
The first step in recognizing the complexity of the controversy is 
in understanding the importance of Sharia for Muslims.  To 
Muslims, Sharia is not just a way of life — it is an expression of 
divine truth.261 Consequently, any Muslim who lives in an Is-
lamic State and does not follow Sharia is not only subject to 
legal reprobation, but also to spiritual damnation.262  The impor-
tance to Muslims of extending Sharia within the Muslim major-
ity North is therefore understandable.  Nevertheless, the con-
flicting philosophical and spiritual notions of human rights and 
freedom between international human rights law and Sharia 
continue to haunt the international community and Nigeria.263 
2. Reconciling International Human Rights 
 and Sharia 
Majid Khadduri who is a leading scholar in Islamic law iden-
tifies individual freedom, dignity, brotherhood, equality without 
prejudice, respect for the honor, reputation, and family of each 
individual, as well as, the right to be presumed innocent as the 
“most important human rights principles in Islam.”264  Although 
these principles seem to agree with international human rights 
  
 258. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, art. 11, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.  
 259. PETERS, supra note 117, at 37. 
 260. Id. at 38.  
 261. Isha Khan, Islamic Human Rights: Islamic Law and International 
Human Rights Standards, 5 APPEAL 74, 76 (1999) [hereinafter Khan, Islamic 
Human Rights].  
 262. Id.  
 263. Id. at 78 (“While Western countries may suggest that the countries 
applying traditional or conservative Islamic law have no regard for human 
rights, the Islamic world asserts itself as a champion of the human rights 
provided for by God, in the Shar’ia.”).    
 264. Id. at 78.  
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standards, the underlying philosophy of Islam that all human 
acts are subject to God’s will, versus the Western notion of free 
will, actually contravene international law in the application of 
Sharia. 265   The most controversial tension between Islamic law 
and international law concerns the unequal treatment of 
women under Islamic law.266   
Sharia advocates argue that Islam actually empowers women 
by giving them a “special rank” in the Islamic order.267  Islamic 
reformers have responded, in support of Sharia, to the interna-
tional community by employing a cultural relativist approach.268  
But, even within the scope of cultural relativism, there are 
varying degrees of conformity to international law.269  For exam-
ple, modern Islamic reformers have attempted to legitimize 
Sharia by advocating a liberal interpretative approach.270  Fur-
ther, by employing a historical perspective, the reformers argue 
that the contentious gender provisions of the Qu’ran were made 
to protect women in case of marriage dissolution.271  However, 
Western critics argue that the provisions reflect “unfounded 
gender inequity.” 272  
Islamic countries, including Nigeria, have also justified their 
actions, such as the advancement of the Sharia Project, to the 
international community, by adopting a defensive attitude to-
ward the Western world.273  These advocates argue that the 
international community has disproportionately targeted Islam   
 265. Id.  
 266. Id. One such tension is that Sharia allegedly gives husbands the right 
to chastise their wives for “disobedience” which includes a “light beating.”  Id.  
 267. Khan, Islamic Human Rights, supra note 261, at 79. Proponents argue 
that Sharia makes special provisions for women to provide them with finan-
cial security and stability, which they were historically unable to achieve by 
themselves.  Specifically, Muslims point to Qu’ranic provisions which state 
“Men have qawarma [guardianship and authority] over women because they 
[men] spend their property in supporting them [women].”  Id.  
 268. Id. at 79.   
 269. Id.  For example, strict relativists view the world in relative terms 
while moderate relativists recognize the need for some minimal standards; 
finally universalists value western concepts of rights.  Id.  
 270. Id. at 80. “These reformers argue that the sources of Sharia law should 
be examined from a strictly historical perspective, and that much of the literal 
interpretation of Qu’ranic scripture should be contextualized, and in some 
cases abandoned.”  Id.  
 271. Id.  
 272. Id.  
 273. Khan, Islamic Human Rights, supra note 261, at 79.  
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ternational community has disproportionately targeted Islam 
for human rights violations, and as a result, the media has un-
fairly responded to the resurgence of Islam by also pushing Is-
lam to the forefront of international human rights.274  They ar-
gue that the Western media is aggressive and unfair in con-
stantly highlighting images of rape, polygamy, female genital 
mutilation, violence against women, and segregation of the 
sexes.275  Further, many advocates argue that the Western me-
dia skews Sharia by failing to distinguish between common 
practice and extremism and by portraying Islamic law as re-
strictive of individual rights, patriarchal, and demeaning to 
women.276 For example, by equating such things as wearing the 
burka (veiled covering worn by many Muslim women) with a 
universal oppression of women through sexual segregation,277 
the Western media have hindered the development of a legiti-
mate method for reconciling Islamic law with international hu-
man rights standards.278  
V. POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO RESOLVING THE SHARIA PROJECT  
A. Traditional Approaches 
 
The federal Nigerian government’s attempts to resolve the 
debate by itself, thus far, have been fruitless, leaving Nigeria 
with the only option of relying upon international law.  How-
ever, as discussed above, one of the major problems underlying 
  
 274. Id.   
This has allowed the West to suppress the Islamic revivalist move-
ment and the rise of radical Islamic fundamentalism by rallying the 
international human rights community, which itself is largely 
grounded in Western rights and values, to assert its abhorrence for 
the human rights violations taking place in parts of the Islamic 
world. Because human rights in theses Islamic countries are rooted 
in Islamic theology but are also tempered by political and economic 
relations with the West, the West has used this means to assert its 
power in the international community, and to protect its secular, 
socio-democratic power structure. 
Id.  
 275. Id. at 82. 
 276. Id. at 75.   
 277. Id. at 82.  
 278. Id.  
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the Sharia Project is the inability to reconcile Sharia with both 
Nigerian domestic law and international law.  The international 
community and Sharia advocates, though, have offered numer-
ous theoretical approaches to resolving and legitimizing the 
Sharia Project.279   
A few approaches offered by international legal scholars con-
sist of a cultural relativist approach, divided further into strict 
and moderate cultural relativism, a universalist approach and a 
feminist approach.280 Many Muslim scholars offer similar ap-
proaches, but with an Islamic perspective: the cultural relativ-
ist approach, the contemporary and liberal interpretative ap-
proach, and an Islamic universalist approach.281   
Both international and Muslim cultural relativists believe 
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to establish universal hu-
man rights standards that apply equally to all cultures.282  Strict 
cultural relativists recognize the contravention of international 
human rights by Sharia, but offer no tangible solution to this 
problem.283  Instead, they denounce universal standards for the 
protection of cultural values.284  Moderate cultural relativists 
acknowledge the problem, such as the Sharia Project, and at-
tempt to resolve the problem by incorporating universal norms 
into pre-existing cultural norms.285  International universalists 
reject cultural diversity in favor of universal human rights 
standards.286  Finally, international feminist theorists either, 
deconstruct all possible solutions to the problem, such as the 
Sharia Project, advocate liberal individual autonomy, or create 
new “female rights” that work toward a change and resolution 
in policy.287  
  
 279. Khan, Islamic Human Rights, supra note 261, at 79.   
 280. Kimberly Younce Schooley, Cultural Sovereignty, Islam, and Human 
Rights — Toward a Communitarian Revision, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 651, 713 
(1994).  
 281. Khan, Islamic Human Rights, supra note 261, at 79–81.  
 282. Id. at 79.  This assertion is premised on the notion that there are too 
many and too diverse cultural traditions, political structures, and levels of 
development in the world to establish universal human rights norms.  Id.  
 283. Schooley, supra note 280, at 713.  
 284. Id.  
 285. Id.  
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
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As briefly described in Part IV.B.2 of this Note, unlike the in-
ternational community, modern Islamic reformers argue for a 
liberal interpretative approach.288  This approach is consistent 
with the moderate relativist approach, arguing that Sharia law 
sources should be examined from a strictly historical perspec-
tive.289  Modern Islamic reformers also believe that much of the 
literal interpretation of Qu’ranic scripture should be contextual-
ized, and in some cases, abandoned.290  Finally, some Muslims 
attempt to legitimize and support Sharia’s contravention with 
Islamic human rights by asserting their belief that Islamic law 
is in fact universal.291  These supporters argue that God is the 
sovereign ruler of the universe, therefore, “to break the law is a 
transgression against both society and God, a crime and a sin; 
the guilty are subject to punishment in this life and the next.”292  
These Islamic universalists also argue that Islam does in fact 
protect human rights, but according to its own set of values.293   
While these various scholarly approaches are relevant and nec-
essary to the dialogue surrounding the Sharia Project and Is-
lamic law’s role in international human rights, they have never-
theless failed to achieve universal support from either the Mus-
lim or international communities.   
B. A Cross-Cultural Approach 
The highly respected Islamic scholar Abdullahi Ahmed An-
Na’im offers an alternative international legal approach that 
has seen some support from both Muslims and the international 
community.  An-Na’im “maintain[s] that the lack of insuffi-
ciency of cultural legitimacy of human rights standards is one of 
the main underlying causes of violations of those standards.”294   
  
 288. Khan, Islamic Human Rights, supra note 261, at 80.  
 289. Id. at 80.  
 290. Id.  
 291. Id. at 81. 
 292. Id.  
 293. Id. 
 294. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to 
Defining International Standards of Human Rights: The Meaning of Cruel, 
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 19 (Abdullahi Ah-
med An-Na’im  ed., 1992) [hereinafter Cross-Cultural Approach].  
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An-Na’im argues that the first step to protecting human 
rights standards and to resolving human rights violations is to 
address the multitude of political, economic, cultural, and social 
factors underlying state actions.295  This Note has discussed the 
various socio-economic and cultural factors that have helped 
initiate and support the rise of the Sharia Project.296  The next 
step to resolving conflicts similar to the Sharia Project is to 
formulate or recognize a possible international legal approach 
applicable to the conflict.  An-Na’im has offered the interna-
tional legal community such an approach: a “cross-cultural ap-
proach.”297 
An-Na’im’s cross-cultural approach focuses on a policy of dis-
course, legitimization of values, and understanding between 
societies.  This approach advocates and focuses on the individu-
als’ right to safeguard their personal integrity and human dig-
nity against excessive or harsh punishments imposed by their 
own governments, such as the Hadd punishments for adul-
tery.298  At the same time, imposing external moral standards 
upon an alleged human rights violator is also counter-
productive and likely to be unsuccessful.299  Thus, for example, 
  
 295. Id. at 19. 
 296. See supra Parts II–IV.  
 297. Cross-Cultural Approach, supra note 294, at 19. (“I argue that internal 
and cross-cultural legitimacy for human rights standards needs to be devel-
oped, while I advance some tentative ideas to implement this approach.”).   
For the purpose of this discussion, An-Na’im defines cultures as: 
[P]rovid[ing] both the individual and the community with the values 
and interests to be pursued in life, as well as the legitimate means for 
pursuing them.  It stipulates the norms and values that contribute to 
people’s perception of their self-interest and the goals and methods of 
individual and collective struggles for power within a society and be-
tween societies.  As such, culture is a primary force in the socializa-
tion of individuals and a major determinant of the consciousness and 
experience of the community.  The impact of culture on human be-
havior is often underestimated precisely because it is so powerful and 
deeply embedded in our self-identity and consciousness. 
Id. at 23.     
 298. Id. at 37–38. 
 299. Id. at 20, 38.   
Even though outsiders may sympathize with and wish to support the 
dominated and oppressed groups or classes, their claiming to know 
what is the valid view of culture of that society will not accomplish 
this effectively.  Such a claim would not help the groups the outsiders 
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An-Na’im argues that “[g]reater consensus on international 
standards for the protection of the individual against cruel, in-
human, or degrading treatment or punishment can be achieved 
through internal cultural discourse and cross-cultural dia-
logue.”300   
The cross-cultural approach primarily relies on the notion 
that “[p]eople are more likely to observe normative propositions 
if they believe them to be sanctioned by their own cultural tra-
ditions, observance of human rights standards can be improved 
through the enhancement of the cultural legitimacy of those 
standards.”301  Therefore, in the Sharia Project instance, the 
North, the South, the federal Nigerian government, and inter-
national scholars and legislators would need to engage in a dia-
logue about the contentions and disparities between Sharia and 
international human rights standards.  Specifically, in the case 
of the Hadd punishments for adultery, the international com-
munity and Sharia opponents would first need to analyze and 
understand the zina laws from the perspective of Sharia advo-
cates and argue their invalidity, under international law, via a 
Qu’ranic reinterpretation of the relevant Sharia laws and the 
Qu’ran itself.  For example, this may be possible by allowing 
Sharia opponents within the Muslim community (internal 
community) to redefine their own identity and rights by high-
lighting inconsistent provisions in the Qu’ran relating to zina.       
This approach, though, first requires the international com-
munity and domestic communities in situations of internal 
strife, such as those in Nigeria, to recognize that despite a di-
versity of cultural practice and tradition, societies share certain 
fundamental values and interests that could be articulated into 
a common “culture” of universal human rights.302  Most impor-
tantly, An-Na’im does not suggest that this approach is an “all 
  
wish to support because it portrays them as agents of an alien cul-
ture, thereby frustrating their efforts to attain legitimacy for their 
view of the values and norms of their society. 
Id. at 20.  
 300. Id. at 38.  An-Na’im argues that people of diverse cultural backgrounds 
can agree upon differing meanings, scope and methods of international human 
rights standard through “internal reinterpretation of, and a cross-cultural 
dialogue about, the meaning and implications of basic human rights values 
and norms.”  Id. at 21.    
 301. Cross-Cultural Approach, supra note 294, at 20. 
 302. Id. at 21. 
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or nothing” approach; rather, he suggests that while total 
agreement is unrealistic in many cases, significant agreement 
about certain issues is possible.303  The true object of a cross-
cultural dialogue is therefore to agree on a body of beliefs to 
guide action in support of human rights, despite disagreement 
over the justification, interpretation and application of those 
beliefs. 304  
An-Na’im offers an example of this approach by comparing 
the international community’s interpretation of Article 7 of the 
ICCPR, which states, “no one shall be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” with 
the Islamic law interpretation of the article.305  The interpreta-
tion of Article 7, by Sharia advocates can be starkly different 
from the international community’s interpretation of this Arti-
cle.306  For example, Sharia offenses are classified into three 
main categories: hudud,307 jinayat,308 and ta’zir.309  Sharia re-
quires states, in pursuing conviction for these offenses, to en-
sure decent standards of living and secure social and economic 
justice for Muslims before enforcing the punishments.310  Sharia 
also requires strict standards of proof and provides narrow 
definitions of these offenses, making a wide range of defenses 
  
 303. Id. at 39.  
For example, in relation to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment, there is room for agreement on a wide range of substan-
tive and procedural matters even in relations of an apparently in-
flexible position, such as the Islamic position on Qu’ranic punish-
ments. Provided such agreement is sought with sufficient sensitivity, 
the general status of human rights will be improved, and wider 
agreement can be achieved in relation to other human rights. 
Id.  
 304. Id. at 29.  
 305. Id.  
 306. Id. at 33. 
 307. Id.  Hudud are a limited group of offenses which are strictly defined 
and punished by express terms of the Qu’ran and/or Sunna, including offenses 
such as theft — punished by amputation of the right hand, and fornication — 
punished by a whipping of 100 lashes for an unmarried offender or stoning to 
death for a married offender.  Id.  
 308. Id. Jinayat are homicide or causing bodily injury, punishable by exact 
retribution (eye for an eye) or payment of monetary compensation.  Id.  
 309. Id. Ta’zir are offenses created and punished by the ruler in exercising 
his power to protect public and private interests.  Id.  
 310. Cross-Cultural Approach, supra note 294, at 34.  
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available to the accused.311  With this understanding, the basic 
question in applying a cross-cultural approach to international 
law and Sharia is one of interpretation and application of uni-
versally accepted human rights.312   
In the Sharia situation, most Muslims would accept that hu-
mans have the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment, however the Islamic inter-
pretation of this human right differs from the international 
standard.313  An-Na’im argues that from a secular and humanist 
view, Sharia punishments are cruel and inhuman.314  However, 
for many Muslims, under at least one interpretation of Islam, 
the matter of punishment is settled by the will of God and ex-
pressed by the Qu’ran, which is not open for interpretation or 
question.315  This is because Muslims believe that religious life 
does not end with this life but extends to the next life, so it is 
believed that a religiously sanctioned punishment in this life 
will absolve an offender from a greater or harsher punishment 
in the next life.316   For this reason “in Muslim societies, human 
judgment regarding the appropriateness or cruelty of a pun-
ishment decreed by God is simply out of the question.”317  As a 
result, An-Na’im suggests that steps can be taken, in approach-
ing a cross-cultural perspective to Sharia.318  
[T]here is room for developing stronger general social and eco-
nomic prerequisites and stricter procedural requirements for 
the enforcement of the punishment. Islamic religious texts 
emphasize extreme caution in inflicting any criminal punish-
ment. The Prophet said that if there is any doubt (shubha), 
the Qu’ranic punishments should not be imposed. He also said 
that it is better to err on the side of refraining from imposing 
the punishment than to err on the side of imposing it in a 
doubtful case. Although these directives have already been in-
corporated into definitions of the offenses and the applicable 
  
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. at 35. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id.  
 316. Cross-Cultural Approach, supra note 294, at 35.  
 317. Id at 36.  It is also believed that harsh punishments are necessary to 
reform and rehabilitate the thief, as well as to protect society and individuals 
by deterring potential offenders.  Id.  
 318. Id. at 36. 
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rules of evidence and procedure, it is still possible to develop a 
broader concept of shubha to include, for example, psychologi-
cal disorders as a defense against criminal responsibility. For 
instance, kleptomania may be taken as shubha barring pun-
ishment for theft. Economic need may also be a defense again 
a charge of theft.319 
Ultimately, as stated earlier, under a cross-cultural approach, 
external societies would not impose their morals upon Islamic 
societies but engage in a dialogue with Islamic societies to work 
toward a mutual understanding or agreement upon the various 
mechanisms underlying Sharia application. This dialogue 
would focus primarily on a reinterpretation and redefining of 
Sharia law, values, and customs, and a reconciliation of these 
factors with international human rights through discourse.    
C. Self-Determination as an Approach to Dispute Resolution in 
the Post-Colonial African State. 
The last few decades of the twentieth century saw a sharp in-
crease in the number of new states, resulting from the end of 
the Cold War, the demise of European communism, and decolo-
nization.320  It is becoming increasingly apparent that the prin-
ciples leading up to the decolonization of African states have 
backfired upon the continent and the international community 
at large.321  The current rise of political corruption, unbridled 
militaries, ethnic conflicts, refugee flows, and economic misery 
in Africa can be seen as rooted in the creation of the post-
colonial borders.322   
Numerous legal scholars, such as Dr. Makau wa Mutua,323 ar-
gue that “the foreign imposition of artificial states and their 
continued entrapment within the concepts of statehood and 
sovereignty are sure to occasion the extinction of Africa unless 
those sacred cows are set aside for now to disassemble African 
  
 319. Id.  
 320. Mutua, supra note 1, at 1113.  
 321. Id. at 1113–14.  
 322. Id. at 1114–15. 
 323. Dr. Mutua is co-director of the Human Rights Center at the State Uni-
versity of New York at Buffalo. At the time he wrote this Article “Why Redraw 
the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry” he was Associate Director of 
the Human Rights Program at Harvard Law School.  Mutua, supra note 1, at 
1113.  
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States and reconfigure them.”324  These scholars argue for self-
determination for the post-colonial African States, as a possible 
solution to internal disputes, such as the Sharia Project.325  This 
is the case for Nigeria.  The rise of ethnic tension in Nigeria, 
resulting from the Sharia Project, has led many political lead-
ers in the Muslim North to ask for secession and to call for self-
determination.326  
One of the major arguments in favor of self-determination, in 
Nigeria and throughout Africa, is that while all of these African 
States subscribe to international law, none of these states par-
ticipated in the creation of the law prior to decolonization.327  
Another argument is that numerous pre-existing ethno-political 
communities and traditional African States were combined by 
force or through treaties to create the new post-colonial states.328   
These post-colonial boundaries were often drawn arbitrarily 
and driven by pressures of competition between European pow-
ers, European trading companies, and Christian missionaries.329  
This coercive environment resulted in the elimination of sover-
eignty for many pre-colonial ethnic communities and kingdoms, 
including in Nigeria.330  As a result of these colonial and post-
colonial policies, questions of internal self-determination are on 
the rise again in present-day Africa.  Specifically, numerous 
ethnic communities and kingdoms of post-colonial Africa are 
struggling to regain their pre-colonial sovereignty, as the Mus-
lim North is trying to do currently in Nigeria.331  
The argument for self-determination in the post-colonial Afri-
can context is supported by Article 20 of the African Charter,332 
  
 324. Mutua, supra note 1, at 1113.  
 325. See generally Mutua, supra note 1. 
 326. See generally Ibrahim, supra note 72.  
 327. Mutua, supra note 1, at 1122.  Ethiopia and Liberia are exceptions to 
this argument.  Id.  
 328. Id. at 1134. Thousands of independent pre-colonial states were com-
pressed into forty new states.  Id.  
 329. Id.  
 330. Ahmed El-Obaid and Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua, Human Rights in Af-
rica — A New Perspective on Linking the Past to the Present, 41 MCGILL L.J. 
819, 824 (August 1996).  
 331. Id.  
 332. African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, 
art. 20, 21 I.L.M. 58, 60 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986).  
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which deals with the right of peoples to self-determination.333   
The wording of Article 20 allows for the right to internal and 
external self-determination.334  The scholars El-Obeid and Atua 
further argue that self-determination within the context of the 
African States should provide a wide array of possibilities, in-
cluding the protection of a group’s right to secede.335  They also 
argue that the rights of the people should not be interpreted as 
rights of the state, which are too often translated into the rights 
of the leaders.336  Instead, it is the peoples’ rights and voices that 
should rise above those of their leaders and the arbitrary 
boundaries dictated by external societies, such as the interna-
tional community.  If correctly acknowledged and applied, this 
reconstructed right might be a viable solution for resolving the 
Sharia Project in Nigeria.     
VI. CONCLUSION:  RESOLUTION 
A long troubled political and economic history has led to a re-
ligious civil war of sorts in Nigeria.  The Sharia Project is a 
complicated controversy that not only implicates domestic reli-
gious strife but also international human rights conflict.  The 
question of what can be done, can only be answered by Nigeria 
and the international community taking a step back and trying 
to understand the underlying beliefs and principles of Islamic 
society and Sharia from and insiders perspective.  Foremost, 
the Sharia Project can not be resolved by taking a specific hard-
line approach, whether a universalist or a strict cultural relativ-
ist approach.  For example, the recent religious riots over the 
Miss World Competition show that religious freedom in a “secu-
lar” federalist state is not a simple concept and is not easily re-
solved by taking an extremist approach.  If anything, strict ad-
herents of universalist or cultural relativist approaches have 
been the roots of the problem in Nigeria.  It is therefore impor-
tant to recognize that religious freedom in post-colonial states, 
such as Nigeria, is not just about Sharia or international law, 
but a reconciliation of the two ideologies.  
  
 333. Obaid, supra note 330, at 842.  
 334. Id. at 843. 
 335. Id. at 841. 
 336. Id. at 838. 
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An-Na’im offers a workable approach to reconciling the inter-
nal debate in Nigeria as well as the external struggle between 
international law and Sharia.  An-Na’im argues for positive 
changes in the post-colonial Islamic world by advocating an en-
gaging dialogue between external societies and Islamic socie-
ties.337  The objective is that such a dialogue would foster a mu-
tual understanding or agreement on the various mechanisms 
underlying Sharia in international law, and, hopefully, within 
Nigeria.  He further advocates an internal legitimization of 
human rights standards, through a reinterpretation and refor-
mulation of cultural standards via internal discourse.  Specifi-
cally, by the creation of a “common culture” through the recog-
nition of fundamental values and interests, countries such as 
Nigeria may be able to reconcile the dichotomy between the 
Sharia Project and international human rights standards.   
Nevertheless, the first step toward reconciliation is through 
cultural discourse and dialogue.  A cross-cultural approach pre-
supposes rational societies and the ability of rational societies 
to engage in such a dialogue.  Practically, this supposition may 
render a pure cross-cultural approach at least minimally inef-
fective in such volatile post-colonial Islamic States as Nigeria; 
particularly since external societies, as the Nigerian Christian 
and international communities, have thus far failed to show 
great potential for dialogue and understanding.   
  
 337. See generally Cross-Cultural Approach, supra note 294. 
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 However, there is another possibility for resolving the Sharia 
Project.  The application of a cross-cultural approach combined 
with a greater allowance and reformulation of the notion of in-
ternal self-determination might just advance the Sharia Project 
toward a peaceful resolution.   
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